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Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform.
Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result
pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users’ low tolerance for
search result latency, it is important to resolve these auctions quickly. Current
approaches restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to achieve fast winner
determination, which is the problem of allocating slots to advertisers so as to
maximize the expected revenue given that advertisers are charged what they
bid. The goal of this work is to permit more expressive bidding, thus allowing
advertisers to achieve complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and
scalable techniques for winner determination. To this end, we allow advertisers
to submit programs that express complex and dynamic bidding strategies. We
provide techniques for reducing the amount of program evaluation necessary to
solve the winner determination problem, and we study the complexity of shar-
ing aggregation computations between these programs. In addition, we also
examine the problem of providing advertisers with data about search auctions
without disclosing too much about any individual. We provide algorithms for
both checking and enforcing privacy in this context.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
With the huge number of Internet searches performed every day, search re-
sult pages have become a thriving advertising platform. The results of a search
query are presented to the user as a web page that contains a limited number
of slots for advertisements (typically between four and twenty). On each search
result page, major search engines, like Google and Yahoo, sell these slots to
advertisers via an auction mechanism that charges an advertiser only if a user
clicks on his ad. Most of Google’s multi-billion dollar revenue, and more than
half of Yahoo’s revenue, comes from these so-called sponsored search auctions
[30]; and this market is growing quickly. By 2008, spending by US firms on
sponsored search is expected increase by $3.2 billion from 2006 and will exceed
$9.6 billion, the amount spent on all of online advertising in 2004 [31]. Further-
more, 44% of the current search engine advertisers joined the market within the
last two years [31]. With the increasing market size in mind, it is natural to ap-
proach sponsored search auctions from a database perspective in order to tackle
issues of scalability and expressiveness. This thesis is a step in this direction.
Due to the high volume of searches and the users’ low tolerance for search
result latency, it is imperative to resolve these auctions fast. Current approaches
restrict the expressiveness of bids in order to achieve fast winner determination,
which is the problem of allocating slots to advertisers so as to maximize the ex-
pected revenue given the advertisers’ bids. In Chapter 2, we look at the prob-
lem of permitting more expressive bidding, thus allowing advertisers to achieve
complex advertising goals, while still providing fast and scalable techniques for
winner determination. We allow advertisers to submit bidding programs and
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provide techniques for finding the winning programs efficiently. The material
in Chapter 2 is joint work with Johannes Gehrke and Joseph Halpern. A prelim-
inary version of the work in Chapter 2 appears in [58].
In Chapter 3, we consider various extensions to the techniques proposed in
Chapter 2, such as modeling the case where the probability of receiving a click
depends on the advertisers placed in surrounding slots, allowing advertisers to
bid on blocks of slots in various slot layouts, and dealing with the budget un-
certainty arising from ads that have been displayed from previous auctions but
have not received clicks yet. We also examine applications of our techniques to
other settings for advertisement auctions, such as massively multiplayer online
games, and map searches. The material in Chapter 3 is joint work with Johannes
Gehrke and Joseph Halpern, and portions of this work appears in [58].
The high volume of searches presents an opportunity for sharing the work
required to resolve multiple auctions that occur simultaneously. In Chapter 4,
we introduce the problem of shared winner determination and provide tech-
niques for sharing work between multiple search auctions using shared aggre-
gation and shared sort. Our analysis suggests a general framework which we
use to study the complexity of optimally sharing various abstract aggregation
operators that might be used in bidding programs. The material in Chapter 4
is joint work with Joseph Halpern, with Mingsheng Hong and Walker White
providing many useful discussions.
In order to enable advertisers to improve their bidding strategies, it would
be helpful if search providers release historical search and auction data. How-
ever, they must do so in such a way as to limit the disclosure about any individ-
ual advertiser while still providing as much useful information as possible. In
2
Chapter 5, we consider the problem of controlling the release of data to advertis-
ers so that they can learn about the market they are participating in and improve
their bidding strategies, while at the same time not disclosing too much infor-
mation about any given advertiser. The material in Chapter 5 is joint work with
Daniel Kifer, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Johannes Gehrke, and Joseph Halpern.
A preliminary versions of this work appear in [59] and [60].
The work on this thesis was supported in part by NSF under Grants IIS-
0534064, IIS-0534404, and IIS-0725260, and by grants from Microsoft.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARD EXPRESSIVE AND SCALABLE SPONSORED SEARCH
AUCTIONS
2.1 Introduction
With the huge number of Internet searches performed every day, search result
pages have become a thriving advertising platform. The results of a search
query are presented to the user as a web page that contains a limited num-
ber of slots for advertisements (typically between four and twenty). On each
search result page, major search engines, like Google and Yahoo, sell these slots
to advertisers via an auction mechanism that charges an advertiser only if a user
clicks on his ad. Most of Google’s multi-billion dollar revenue, and more than
half of Yahoo’s revenue, comes from these so-called sponsored search auctions
[30]; and this market is growing quickly. By 2008, spending by US firms on
sponsored search is expected increase by $3.2 billion from 2006 and will exceed
$9.6 billion, the amount spent on all of online advertising in 2004 [31]. With
the increasing market size in mind, it is natural to approach sponsored search
auctions from a database perspective in order to tackle issues of scalability and
expressiveness. This work is a first step in this direction.
Sponsored search auctions currently work as follows:
1. Bid submission. Advertisers submit bids on clicks for certain keywords
offline.
2. User search. A user submits a search query.
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3. Winner determination. Slots are assigned to advertisers by the search
provider based on the advertisers’ bids.
4. User action. The search result page is returned to the user who may now
click on one or more of the sponsored links.
5. Pricing and payment. The search provider charges an advertiser accord-
ing to some pricing rule if the user clicks on the advertiser’s sponsored
link.
The speed of the winner determination in Step 3 is crucial. Since the win-
ning ads are displayed on the search result page, winner determination must be
done before the page can be returned to the user. In current sponsored search
auctions, this winner determination can be done quickly because advertisers are
limited to submitting a single bid on whether or not the user clicks on their ad.
Unfortunately, the limited bidding in current sponsored search auctions is
insufficient to meet advertisers’ needs in two respects:
1. Bidding on Multiple Features. Once the advertisers’ ads are displayed
on the search results page, the user who submitted the query may click
on the ad and may even make a purchase as a result. Advertisers clearly
value purchases because they represent immediate revenue. They also
value clicks on their ads because they indicate potential customers. How-
ever, even if the user does not click on or buy something, advertisers might
place value on having their ads displayed simply because this increases
their chance to make an impression on the customer. Advertisers who
value brand awareness may wish their ads to be placed in prominent po-
sitions. Such advertisers may prefer their ads to be displayed near the top
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or bottom of the list, but not in the middle. Other advertisers whose goals
are to be perceived as the leaders in their markets may wish their ads to be
displayed in the topmost slot or not displayed at all. Thus it is clear that
advertisers have valuations on clicks, purchases, and slot positions.
Unfortunately, in current search advertising platforms, advertisers are re-
stricted to bidding only on whether they receive a click on their ad. We call
this a single-feature auction, since the advertisers can express their valua-
tions on only one feature, namely, receiving a click. Our goal is to support
multi-feature auctions that would allow advertisers to express valuations on
multiple features, namely, clicks, purchases, and slot positions. Extending
bidding to multiple features is non-trivial; whereas previously the adver-
tiser submitted a single value as depicted in Figure 2.1, now the adver-
tiser can submit a whole table of values for the different combinations of
features, as depicted in Figure 2.2. The fast algorithms for winner deter-
mination that are currently used by Google and Yahoo! do not extend to
non-trivial multi-feature auctions. Moreover, even for single-feature auc-
tions, these algorithms can correctly deal with only a restricted situation,
namely, one where the expected number of clicks on an ad is “separable”
into the product of an advertiser-specific factor and a slot-specific factor.
2. Dynamic Bidding Strategies. The language that search providers such
as Google and Yahoo currently use to let advertisers express their bidding
preferences is rather limited. While the language does allow advertisers
to specify a limited number of parameters to constrain their bids (such
as a daily budget, and geographic targets), the language is often insuffi-
ciently expressive for serious advertisers to express their preferences and
how they change over time. To deal with this, advertisers employ the ser-
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vices of various third-party ad-campaign management companies (such
as iProspect, SureHits, Atlas, etc.) that monitor the outcomes of auctions
and periodically resubmit bids on behalf of the advertiser in an attempt to
approximate the advertisers’ preferences as much as possible. The kinds
of goals that they try to achieve include maintaining a specified slot posi-
tion during certain hours of the day, maintaining a slot position above a
specified competitor, and equalizing the return on investment (ROI) across
multiple keywords. The success of such ad-campaign management com-
panies demonstrates the desire among advertisers for more complex ex-
pressive bidding in search auctions. Again, advertisers want these, but
can only pick from a set of pre-defined strategies that these companies
provide.
With the increasing market size in mind, our goal is to design a framework
that allows huge numbers of advertisers to bid on a richer set of features using
dynamic bidding strategies while simultaneously allowing the search provider
to determine winners quickly. We approach sponsored search auctions from a
database perspective, and tackle issues of scalability and expressiveness. Our
main contribution is an efficient and scalable infrastructure that permits much
more expressive bidding than is currently available. In particular, we provide
• a simple but rich language that allows advertisers to express their high-
level bidding strategies as bidding programs which take as input the search
query and various statistics about auction history and performance, and
output bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions (Section 2.2);
• an efficient, scalable, and parallelizable algorithm to solve winner deter-
mination given the bids output by the bidding programs (Section 2.3); and
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• techniques to reduce the amount of work necessary for evaluating the bid-
ding programs of multiple advertisers (Section 2.4).
This gives advertisers direct and fine-grained control over their advertising
strategies, as opposed to limiting them to a menu of pre-defined goals, without
sacrificing speed and scalability of solving winner determination. We evaluate
our techniques experimentally in Section 2.5, and we conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Bidding Strategies as Programs
In this section, we formalize the notion of bidding on multiple features, and we
propose a simple language for dynamic strategies that bid on these features.
2.2.1 Multiple Features
Recall that traditionally an advertiser could only bid on one property of the out-
come, namely, whether his ad received a click. Now we would like to allow ad-
vertisers to bid on additional properties as well, namely whether a purchase was
made, and whether his ad was displayed within a desired set of slots. To each
advertiser, we make available the following predicates that indicate whether or
not the outcome has one of these desired properties.
1. Slot j , indicating that the advertiser gets slot j, for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with k
being the number of slots.
2. Click , indicating that the user clicked on the advertiser’s ad.
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Table 2.1: Single-feature Valuation
Click value
Y 3
3. Purchase, indicating that the user made a purchase via a link from the
advertiser’s ad.
Conceptually, the advertiser associates a value with each truth assignment to
these predicates, as depicted in Figure 2.2. However, the size of such a repre-
sentation is exponential in the number of predicates. So we represent bids as
OR-bids on Boolean combinations of predicates instead. That is, we let the ad-
vertiser fill in a Bids table where each row corresponds to a Boolean formula of
predicates and the amount that he is willing to pay should that formula be true.
If multiple formulas are true, the advertiser can be charged the sum of the cor-
responding amounts. For example, the Bids table depicted in Table 2.3 indicates
that the advertiser is willing to pay 5 cents if he gets a purchase; 2 cents if his ad
is displayed in either positions 1 or 2; and 7 cents if he gets a purchase and his
ad is displayed in positions 1 or 2.
2.2.2 Dynamic Strategies
As we said, we are interested in designing a programming language that lets
advertisers express more complex preferences, which may change over time. In-
stead of providing advertisers with a pre-defined selection of advertising strate-
gies, we let the advertisers submit their bidding strategies as programs for the
search provider to run. Conceptually, each time a user submits a search query
9
Table 2.2: Multi-feature Valuation
Purchase Click Slot1 Slot2 Slot3 value
Y Y Y N N 7
N Y Y N N 2
...
...
...
...
...
...
Y Y N N Y 5
N Y N N Y 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 2.3: Bids Table
formula value
Purchase 5
Slot1 ∨ Slot2 2
to the search provider, these programs are triggered. The main purpose of these
programs is to output bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions that may
result from displaying their ad on the search result page. In order to do so,
each program creates a Bids table as described in Section 2.2.1 each time there
is a sponsored search auction. These programs have access to several variables
pertinent to the current auction and to the advertiser, such as the keywords in
the search query, the time of day, the advertiser’s remaining budget, the cur-
rent return on investment for the keywords that the advertiser is interested in,
and so on. These variables are stored in tables, some of which are read-only
shared between all advertisers (such as the time and location of the search) and
some of which are private to each advertiser (such as information about the
keywords that the advertiser is interested in). The programs can then be writ-
ten using simple SQL updates without recursion and side-effects. SQL triggers
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Table 2.4: Keywords Table
text formula maxbid roi bid relevance
boot Click ∧ Slot1 5 2 4 0.8
shoe Click 6 1 8 0.2
can be used to activate programs when an auction begins and to notify pro-
grams if they received a slot, click, or purchase. Programs can modify their pri-
vate tables, although commonly used variables, such as amount spent, budget
remaining, return on investment for various keywords, etc. can be automat-
ically maintained for each program by the search provider. For example, the
advertiser-specific variables related to keywords are stored in a Keyword table,
as depicted in Table 2.4 that is private to each advertiser. Each tuple in the Key-
word table corresponds to a bid for a keyword that the advertiser is interested.
The attributes of the tuple contain, among other things, the formula for the bid,
keyword’s relevance score in the search query, the return on investment that
this keyword has provided the advertiser, the maximum amount that the ad-
vertiser is willing to bid on a click by a user who searched for this keyword, and
the amount of money that the advertiser is currently bidding for the keyword.
The search provider updates the return on investment for a keyword each time
a user searches for the keyword and then clicks on the advertiser’s ad. The bid-
ding program can be stored with its private tables to improve locality. Since
bidding programs use private tables and read-only shared tables, they do not
interact with each other when they are triggered by a new search query. Hence
they can be distributed across several machines and run in parallel if necessary.
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2.2.3 An Example: Equalizing ROI
We now give a concrete example of a dynamic bidding strategy that bids on
multiple features. Our example combines the dynamic ROI equalizing heuris-
tic mentioned in Section 2.1 with bidding on two features, clicks and the top
slot; the advertiser is interested in receiving clicks for two keywords, “boot”
and “shoe”, but also wants to be perceived as the leading supplier of boots and
so would be willing to pay extra to be shown in the top slot if the search query
is highly relevant to boots. In order to control his spending, the advertiser has
a target spending rate that he wishes to maintain. The ROI equalizing heuristic,
as suggested in [16], tries to dynamically allocate spending across the different
keywords and bids so as to maximize the advertiser’s “bang for the buck”. If
the advertiser is underspending (i.e., his current spending rate is lower than his
target spending rate), then the advertiser increases the bids on keywords that
have been most profitable for him (i.e., those with the highest return on invest-
ment). If the advertiser is overspending (i.e., his current spending rate is higher
than his target spending rate), then the advertiser decreases the bids on key-
words that have been least profitable for him (i.e., those with the lowest return
on investment). Return on investment of a bid is the total value gained from the
keyword (e.g., number of clicks received in the top slot times the amount the
advertiser values a click in the top slot) divided by the total amount spent on it.
Figure 2.1 shows the program for this strategy. Line 1 creates a trigger that
waits for a new query to be inserted into the Query table, indicating that a new
auction is taking place. If the advertiser notices that he has been underspend-
ing (line 3), he increases his tentative bids for all relevant keywords that have
provided him with the highest ROI, taking care not to increase the bid past its
12
1 CREATE TRIGGER bid AFTER INSERT ON Query
2 {
3 IF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate THEN
4 UPDATE Keywords
5 SET bid = bid + 1
6 WHERE roi =
7 ( SELECT MAX( K.roi )
8 FROM Keywords K )
9 AND relevance > 0
10 AND bid < maxbid;
11 ELSEIF amtSpent / time < targetSpendRate
12 THEN
13 UPDATE Keywords
14 SET bid = bid - 1
15 WHERE roi =
16 ( SELECT MIN( K.roi )
17 FROM Keywords K )
18 AND relevance > 0
19 AND bid > 0;
20 ENDIF;
21
22 UPDATE Bids
23 SET value =
24 ( SELECT SUM( K.bid )
25 FROM Keywords K
26 WHERE K.relevance > 0.7
27 AND K.formula = Bids.formula );
28 }
Figure 2.1: Equalize ROI Strategy
maximum value (lines 4–10). Similarly, lines 13–19 decrease his bids for relevant
keywords with the lowest ROI if he is overspending (line 11), taking care not to
decrease his bid below zero. Next, he updates the values in the Bids table with
the sum of his tentative bids for the corresponding formulas for all sufficiently
relevant keywords, namely, those with a relevance score higher than 0.7 in the
user-submitted search query (lines 22–27). For example, if the Keywords table
is as depicted in Table 2.4 after running lines 1–20, then the output Bids table
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Table 2.5: Bids Table for Example Program
formula value
Click ∧ Slot1 4
Click 0
will be as depicted in Table 2.5.
2.3 Winner Determination
Having empowered the advertisers with a language for expressing dynamic
bidding strategies to bid on a rich set of features, we now seek efficient and
scalable techniques for the search provider to perform winner determination.
All sponsored search auction mechanisms currently in use (see, for example,
[3, 5, 30, 81]) first solve the winner-determination problem and assign slot posi-
tions according to the winning allocation, and then use some method of charg-
ing prices for the positions, such as charging each advertiser their social oppor-
tunity cost (this is known as Vickrey pricing [21, 39, 82]), or charging advertiser in
the kth slot the amount bid by the next-highest bidder (this is known as general-
ized second-pricing [30]). Note that, with most pricing schemes, a provider’s rev-
enue is not the revenue that is computed in the winner-determination problem.
Nevertheless, the first step in all these auctions is to do winner determination.
Furthermore, given winner determination as a subroutine, the pricing schemes
used in these auctions (i.e., Vickrey pricing, generalized second-pricing, etc.)
can all be expressed as very simple computations. In our work, therefore, we
focus on optimizing the winner-determination computation.
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2.3.1 How Winner Determination Works
The winner-determination problem is to compute the allocation of slots to advertis-
ers that results in the highest expected revenue for the search engine provider,
under the assumption that advertisers actually pay what they bid. In keeping
with Google and Yahoo policy, we restrict the slot allocations to those in which
no advertiser gets assigned more than one slot. This prevents extremely wealthy
advertisers from monopolizing all the available slots. We call this the assignment
restriction; in Chapter 3, we return to this issue and lift the restriction.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an allocation, we
need the advertisers’ bids on clicks, purchases, and slot positions as specified in
their Bids tables. For now, we assume that we actually run all of the advertis-
ers’ bidding programs to get their resulting Bids tables. In Section 2.4, we give
techniques that require us to run only a small subset of programs under certain
conditions.
In order to compute the expected revenue resulting from an allocation, we
also need the probabilities that the formulas in the Bids tables are true in the
final outcome. We thus consider the set of all possible outcomes that describe
which slot was allocated to which advertiser together with which advertisers
received clicks and purchases. The probabilities of clicks and purchases depend
on the search provider’s allocation of slots to advertisers. For example, ads
placed at the top are more likely to be noticed and clicked on than those placed
in the middle of the page [65]. As a reasonable first-order approximation, we
assume that the probability that a given advertiser gets a click depends only
on the slot allocated to him, and that the probability that he gets a purchase
depends only on whether he got a click and on the slot allocated to him. Fur-
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thermore, we assume that the search provider has (or can estimate, using data
it has collected) these click and purchase probabilities for each advertiser and
each slot allocation to that advertiser.
Note that a complete representation of the probabilities of all possible for-
mulas for each advertiser is exponential in the number of features. Although
this is not too large in our setting, the complete set of probabilities should be
stored in a database separate from the run-time system, which itself should store
only probabilities for the formulas mentioned in the bidding programs and Key-
word tables, since these are the only probabilities that are used. Furthermore,
the probabilities can be partitioned by advertiser and should be stored with the
advertiser’s bidding program and private tables to improve locality.
2.3.2 Complexity
Given the assumptions on slot allocations and distributions above, we look at
the complexity of solving the winner-determination problem given bids in our
language. Recall that a bidding program’s output is an OR-bid represented by
a Bids table whose rows contain bids of the form “Pay $d1 for E1”, . . . , “Pay
$dm for Em”, where E1, . . . , Em are Boolean combinations of the Slot j , Click , and
Purchase predicates. Recall that, in addition, we assume that, for any allocation,
we have a distribution on outcomes, conditional on that allocation. Each for-
mula Ei can be identified with an event on the set of possible outcomes, namely,
the set of outcomes in which Ei is true. Toward proving that winner determina-
tion is tractable for bids in our language, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.3.1 (m-dependent event) An event is m-dependent if there are at
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most m advertisers such that probability of the event given any allocation depends only
on the placement of those m advertisers.
That is, an event is m-dependent if it is independent of the slots assigned to
all but m advertisers. For example, the event that a given advertiser gets a click
is 1-dependent, since we assumed that the probability of an advertiser getting
a click depends only on the slot position of that advertiser. Similarly, the event
that a given advertiser is in either the top slot or the bottom slot is 1-dependent,
since it depends only on the slot assigned to that advertiser. However, given
two advertisers, the event that one gets the top position and the second gets
the bottom is 2-dependent, since it depends on the slots assigned to both those
advertisers.
We assume that the representation of each m-dependent event includes the
labels of the m advertisers on whose slot assignment the event depends. The
following theorem says that winner determination is tractable for 1-dependent
events.
Theorem 2.3.2 For OR-bids that contain formulas corresponding to 1-dependent
events, the winner-determination problem is in polynomial time.
Proof Consider any bid of $d on E, where E is a formula corresponding to a
1-dependent event that depends on the slot assigned to only one advertiser, say
i. If advertisers pay what they bid, then, in all outcomes, this bid contributes
exactly the same amount to the revenue as the OR-bid of $d on E ∧ Slot i1, $d
on E ∧ Slot i2, . . . , $d on E ∧ Slot ik, and $d on E ∧ (∧j¬Slot ij), where Slot ij is a
propositional variable that is true iff advertiser i gets slot j. This is because
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Slot i1, . . . , Slot
i
k correspond to mutually exclusive events, given that the alloca-
tions are restricted to at most one slot per advertiser. We can thus fill out a
table of advertisers versus slots where the entry for the ith advertiser and the
jth slot is the sum of the total expected revenue from bids on formulas of form
E ∧Slot ij , assuming that advertisers pay what they bid. If we interpret this table
as the edge-weight matrix of a bipartite graph between advertisers and slots,
then the winner-determination problem is the problem of finding a maximum-
weight bipartite matching for this graph, which can be done in polynomial time
[53]. 
It follows that winner determination for bids represented by a Bids
table can be solved in polynomial time, since our assumptions in Sec-
tion 2.3.1 guarantee that any Boolean combination of predicates in the set
{Click ,Purchase, Slot1, . . . , Slotk} corresponds to a 1-dependent event.
A natural question to ask is whether we can extend our tractability results
to a language that allows advertisers to bid on formulas corresponding to m-
dependent events, for m ≥ 2. The next result says that winner determina-
tion is APX-hard if we allow bids to be placed on formulas corresponding to
2-dependent events, such as the event that one advertiser is displayed above
another. APX is the class of NP optimization problems that have polynomial-
time constant-factor approximation algorithms [46].
Theorem 2.3.3 For OR-bids that contain formulas corresponding to 2-dependent
events, the winner-determination problem is APX-hard.
Proof We reduce the winner-determination problem to the maximum-weight
feedback arc set problem by using bids on formulas corresponding to 2-
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dependent events to encode the edges in a given weighted directed graphs on
advertisers. Consider any weighted directed graph on n advertisers. Let wi,i′ be
the weight of the edge from advertiser i to advertiser i′. Let Slot ij be the proposi-
tional variable that is true iff advertiser i gets assigned slot j. For two advertisers
i and i′, let Ei>i′ be shorthand for ∨j(Slot ij ∧ ((∨j′>jSlot i
′
j′) ∨ (∧j′¬Slot i
′
j′)), which
corresponds to the event that advertiser i gets a slot and is placed above adver-
tiser i′ who may or may not get a slot. Then Ei>i′ corresponds to a 2-dependent
event, since it depends on the slots assigned to advertisers i and i′. Let each
advertiser i place the following bids: for each i′ 6= i, bid wi,i′ on Ei>i′ . Then, as-
suming advertisers pay what they bid, revenue of wi,i′ will be generated if and
only if advertiser i is placed above advertiser i′. Then winner determination is
equivalent to the problem of finding the maximum-weight feedback arc set over
all size-k subgraphs, which is APX-hard in n and k [46].
In our reduction, each formula in an advertiser’s OR-bid corresponds to a
2-dependent event. This does not preclude the set of all advertisers that these
events depend on from being large (e.g., an advertiser’s OR-bid could contain
n − 1 formulas of the form Ei>i′ for each i′ 6= i). However, the reduction above
gives us an NP-hardness result even if the OR-bids are restricted so that all the
events corresponding to formulas depend on at most two other advertisers in
total (e.g., if each advertiser’s OR-bid contains at most 2 formulas of the form
Ei>i′ with i′ 6= i). This is because the maximum-weight feedback arc set problem
is NP-hard even if the input graphs have degree 3 [64, 48]. 
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Figure 2.2: Separable and Non-separable Click Probabilities
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.8 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 0.7 0.4
Adidas 0.6 0.3
2.3.3 Existing Allocation Algorithms
The allocation algorithms used by Google and Yahoo, as well as those studied in
the literature [5, 3, 30, 81], deal with the issue of scalability by assuming that the
probability of a click resulting from assigning a slot to an advertiser is separable,
that is, it can be written as the product of an advertiser-specific factor and a
slot-specific factor. To illustrate this notion of separability, we provide examples
of separable and non-separable click probabilities in Figure 2.2. The left matrix
in Figure 2.2 is separable because the entries in the matrix can be split into the
product of advertiser-specific factors (namely, 4 for Nike and 3 for Adidas) and
slot specific-factors (namely, 0.2 for slot 1, and 0.1 for slot 2).
When the click probabilities are separable, it is easy to see that winner de-
termination can be performed by assigning the advertisers with jth highest
advertiser-specific factor to the slot with the jth highest slot-specific factor.1 This
can be done in time O(n log k).
Note that the assumption of separability implicitly assumes that the event
that an advertiser gets a click is 1-dependent. Indeed, it assumes the event that
an advertiser gets a click depends on only that advertiser’s slot assignment. But
separability requires much more 1-dependence; it requires that the ratio of the
expected number of clicks on one advertiser in a slot and the expected number
1A more detailed description of this algorithm is given in Chapter 4.
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of clicks on another advertiser in the same slot is the same for all slots. Thus,
separability is a very brittle property; if we change one number in a separable
matrix, it will no longer be separable (as seen, for example, in Figure 2.2).
Not only is separability a much stronger requirement than 1-dependence,
but the techniques for fast winner determination that use this assumption do
not suffice to deal with our bidding language. In particular, they cannot deal
with the situations described in Section 2.1 where one advertiser wants to be
displayed in the top slot or not displayed at all, while another wants to be dis-
played in either the top or bottom slots but not in the middle slots. (Bids repre-
senting these preferences can be easily expressed in our language.)
2.3.4 Maximum-Weight Bipartite Matching
We proved Theorem 2.3.2 by showing that winner determination in this case
is equivalent to maximum-weight bipartite matching between advertisers and
slots, where the edge-weight between an advertiser and a slot is the expected
revenue obtained by assigning that slot to that advertiser. The fastest known
(non-parallel) algorithm to solve this is the Hungarian algorithm, invented by
Kuhn [53] (also known as the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm after being revised by
Munkres [62]); it finds the best matching in time O(nk(n + k)) where n is the
number of advertisers and k is the number of slots. Since this is quadratic in n,
this will not scale well. We want to deal with situations where n can be quite
large (possibly in tens to hundreds of thousands). To make the problem scal-
able, we need it to be linear in n, the number of advertisers. There are parallel
algorithms for maximum-weight matching [36], but these require prohibitively
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Table 2.6: Expected Revenue Matrix
Slot1 Slot2
Nike 9 5
Adidas 8 7
Reebok 7 6
Sketchers 7 4
large numbers (typically Ω(n2)) of processing units in order to achieve linear
running time.
2.3.5 Our Algorithm
We now give a scalable winner-determination algorithm that takes advantage
of the fact that k, the number of slots, is quite small (say less than 20) compared
to n, the number of advertisers. Indeed, n is growing rapidly every year while k
remains the same. We can modify the Hungarian algorithm to get aO(nk log k+
k5) algorithm by considering only those advertisers whose values are in the top
k highest for some slot. That is, for each slot, we consider the k advertisers
who would produce the top k expected revenue if placed in that slot. We take
the union of these advertisers over all the k slots, and consider the bipartite
subgraph containing only these advertisers along with all the k slots. We then
solve maximum-weight bipartite matching problem for this reduced bipartite
graph.
As an example, consider the expected revenue matrix as depicted in Ta-
ble 2.6. There are two slot positions available and four advertisers. The top two
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Figure 2.3: Bipartite Graph Figure 2.4: Reduced Graph
expected revenues for the first slot come from Nike and Adidas, while the top
two expected revenues for the second slot come from Adidas and Reebok. The
corresponding edges in the original bipartite graph between advertisers and
slots have been depicted in bold in Figure 2.3. This bipartite graph is then re-
duced to contain only those advertisers with an adjacent bold edge as depicted
in Figure 2.4.
We observe that the maximum matching for the original problem must occur
for this smaller problem, since if a maximum matching in the original problem
assigned a slot to an advertiser who was not among the top k bidders for that
slot, we can simply reassign that slot to one of these top k bidders who is not
assigned any slot. Note that, since there are only k − 1 other slots, at least one
advertiser in the top k is guaranteed to remain unassigned.
Finding the relevant advertisers takes timeO(nk log k) because, for each slot,
we can find the top k bidders for that slot in time O(k + n log k) by maintaining
a priority heap of size at most k. There are at most k2 such advertisers, since in
the worst case we will have a distinct set of k advertisers for each of the k slots.
Hence, running the Hungarian algorithm on the reduced graph takes timeO(k5)
for a total running time of O(nk log k + k5) for our algorithm.
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Parallelization. Our technique lends itself very well to parallelization. Note
that in our setting there is typically already a high amount of parallelized infras-
tructure present, since the bids are collected from advertisers in a distributed
way. We construct k networks of computers each in the form of a binary tree of
height O(log n) with n leaves. We can compute a maximum matching in time
O(k log n + k5) as follows. For each slot j, we consider the jth binary tree net-
work, which will ultimately compute the top k bidders for that slot at the root:
1. The ith leaf node in the jth network starts out with the expected revenue
from assigning slot j to advertiser i.
2. Each internal node gathers the top k bidders (along with their correspond-
ing bids) from its two children, and combines them into a single list of top
k bidders. This takes time O(k) for each of the O(log n) levels of the tree,
since each level of the tree works in parallel.
3. The root nodes in each of the j-networks take the union of their lists of bid-
ders and compute the maximum-weight matching of these bidders with
the k slots using the Hungarian algorithm. This takes time O(k5), since
there are k slots and at most k2 bidders considered.
Note that we can mix sequential processing with parallel processing by
running more than one program sequentially on each machine, computing
the top k bids, and then aggregating using a tree network as before. If we
have a binary tree network with p nodes, then the total running time becomes
O(n
p
k log k + k log p+ k5).
Finally the O(k5) part of the algorithm (i.e., the part resulting from running
the Hungarian algorithm on the reduced bipartite graph) can be reduced to
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O(k2) using a parallel algorithm, such as that of Fayyazi et al. [36]. The number
of parallel processing units required is O(k5), which is independent of n.
2.4 Top-k Program Evaluation
In Section 2.3.5, we showed that, in order to solve winner determination quickly,
we need to find the advertisers with the top k expected revenue for each slot.
We can easily do this if we have the bids output by the advertisers’ programs.
However, getting these bids for a given search query requires, in the worst case,
running each advertiser’s program for that query. This itself can be quite expen-
sive. An obvious step toward alleviating this problem is for search providers to
use their proprietary keyword matching algorithms to prune away advertisers
who are not interested in the search keywords for the current auction. How-
ever, this is not enough if the search query contains a popular keyword, such
as “music” or “book”, where the set of interested advertisers can still be large.
In this section, we show that we can further reduce the amount of work by tak-
ing advantage of knowledge of the structure of the advertiser’s programs. To
simplify exposition, we assume that advertisers’ programs output bids on only
Click ∧ Slot1, . . . ,Click ∧ Slotk. It is easy to incorporate bids on other formulas,
since both Click and Purchase are assumed to be 1-dependent events.
2.4.1 Threshold Algorithm
We start by considering a situation where the only difference between the pro-
grams used by different advertisers is in the values of certain advertiser-specific
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parameters. More precisely, for each slot j ∈ [k], suppose that each advertiser’s
bids depends on a set of (numeric) parameters Xj in a monotonic way. That is,
there is a monotonic function fj : Xj → R+ that takes as input a value for each
parameter in Xj and outputs a bid for a click in slot j. We allow some subset
of the parameters Yj to be advertiser-specific: these can vary from advertiser to
advertiser (e.g., the amount that they value a particular keyword, the amount
of budget remaining, etc.).
Suppose further that these parameters Yj are updated only by programs that
win the auction. In Section 2.4.3, we consider the case where all programs can
update their state; nonetheless, restricting updates to winning programs is not
unreasonable, since most useful advertiser-specific quantities (such as number
of auctions won, amount spent so far, return on investment for a given keyword,
etc.) change only when the advertiser wins an auction.
The rest of the parameters Zj = Xj \ Yj can be thought of as public global
parameters, and are the same for all advertisers (e.g., the keyword scores as-
sociated with the user’s search query, the time and date, the number of times
the keywords in search query have appeared today). As an example, consider
the situation where advertisers all use the same general strategy of starting each
day by bidding low and then gradually increasing their bids as the end of the
day approaches. However, they each start with a different amount and might
increase their bids at different rates. The starting amounts and the rate of in-
crease would be advertiser-specific parameters in Yj , and the time of day would
be a global parameter in Zj .
For each advertiser i and each slot j, let the edge weight between advertiser
i and slot j be wi,j × fj(yi,j, zj), where wi,j is the probability of advertiser i get-
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ting a click in slot j, yi,j ∈ Yj are the values of the advertiser-specific parameters,
and zj ∈ Zj are the values of the global parameters. We previously showed that
we can solve the maximum-weight matching in time O(nk log k + k5). Under
the assumptions above, we can further reduce the O(nk log k) portion that finds
the top k bidders for each slot as follows. For a given slot j, we also store a list
of bidders sorted by wi,j and incrementally maintain |Yj| lists of bidders, each
sorted by one of the parameters in Yj . We can then run the threshold algorithm
[34] with these lists as input to find the top k advertisers with the highest values
of wi,j×fj(yi,j, zj). Note that we do not need to maintain lists for the parameters
in Zj since all advertisers have the same value for these parameters. Since fj is
monotonic, the threshold algorithm is instance optimal for the class of algorithms
that find the advertisers with the top k values of fj(xi,j) without making “wild
guesses” (i.e., the algorithms must not access an advertiser until that advertiser
is encountered via a sequential scan of one of the lists). Instance optimality
means that, for any input, the threshold algorithm finds the top k values within
a constant factor of the time it takes the fastest algorithm that avoids wild guess
on that input. Given these top k advertisers for each slot, we take O(k5) fur-
ther time to compute the winners as described in Section 2.3.5. To maintain the
sorted lists, once the k winners have been computed, we update their Yj pa-
rameters and accordingly update their positions in the sorted lists, which takes
O(|Yj|k log n) time.
2.4.2 Bid Range Tracking
In the previous section, we examined programs with the same basic structure.
We now examine programs with differing structures. Again, we assume that
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the programs are such that only programs that win the auction update their
private state. Our goal in this section is to reduce work by performing the top
k computation over a restricted set of advertisers in most rounds, while only
periodically having to evaluate the bidding programs of all advertisers.
We use the following observation. Let Ui,j and Li,j be upper and lower
bounds on output bid of advertiser i’s program for slot j. Then we only need to
consider those programs i for which Ui,j is at least as high as the kth highest Li,j
value.
The algorithm maintains a partition the advertisers’ programs into
DefiniteLosers and PossibleWinners, keeping track of upper bounds on the ex-
pected revenues for all advertisers and of lower bounds on the expected rev-
enue for just those advertisers in PossibleWinners. At every step, the partition is
updated by running the following procedure:
1. Compute the expected revenue only for programs in PossibleWinners.
2. Compute the top k expect revenue amongst the exact bids from programs
in PossibleWinners.
3. Update the upper and lower bounds for the expected revenue for the pro-
grams in PossibleWinners.
4. Update the upper bounds for advertisers in DefiniteLosers.
5. Move an advertiser from DefiniteLosers to PossibleWinners if her up-
per bound is at least as high as the kth-highest lower bound from
PossibleWinners.
6. Move an advertiser from PossibleWinners to DefiniteLosers if her upper
bound is less than the kth-highest lower bound from PossibleWinners.
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We can store the programs in DefiniteLosers in a max-heap, prioritized by the
upper bound for the expected revenue from that program, in order to perform
steps 5 and 6 efficiently. If PossibleWinners is much smaller than DefiniteLosers,
the major savings come from finding an upper bound that does not change if an
advertiser loses the auction. This eliminates the need to perform step 4.
As an example, we take the inputs to the program to be: geographic rele-
vance, temporal relevance, user profile relevance, keyword relevance, number
of clicks received so far today, amount paid for clicks so far today, and daily
budget remaining. We make the reasonable assumption that the output bid is
increasing with respect to the first four parameters. Notice that the last three
parameters do not change for losing bidders. (They also happen to be mono-
tonic with respect to time for a given day, but we do not take advantage of that
here.) Thus we can use, as an upper bound, the value of the bidding function
supplied with the maximum possible values for the relevance parameters and
current values for the last three parameters. For a lower bound, we can supply
the minimum values for the relevance parameters that result in a non-zero bid.
2.4.3 Logical Updates
We now consider the case where all program update their state, not just the win-
ners. In certain situations, it is possible to reduce the amount of work done in
this case as well. Consider a situation where many programs update their state
using an operation that maintains their relative bid ordering. For example, sup-
pose that many bidders are using the ROI heuristic described in Section 2.2.3,
each with possibly different target spending rates and maximum bids. As long
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as certain conditions hold (namely, the bid is above zero and the spending rate
is above the target spending rate), the heuristic will decrement its bid for a
given keyword. Thus, if we can maintain a decrement list—that is, a list of pro-
grams, sorted by their bid, that are currently decrementing their bid for a given
keyword—we can avoid explicitly decrementing each program’s bid, by instead
performing a single logical decrement in constant time. That is, the decrement
list is associated with a single adjustment variable, initially zero. A program’s bid
is then the sum of the adjustment variable and the program’s stored bid. So,
in order to decrement the bids of all programs in the list, we simply decrement
the adjustment variable. The sorted order is maintained because all programs
in the list adjust their bids by the same amount.
Of course, the ROI heuristic eventually stops decrementing the bid and starts
to increment it (if the spending rate drops below the target) or keep it constant
(if the bid is zero) instead. At this point we must move the program to an in-
crement list or a constant list as appropriate (similar to a decrement list, except
that the adjustment variable respectively increments or remains constant). At
first glance, this would seem to involve checking checking the conditions for
each program at every auction. However, we observe that such conditions can
often be reduced to waiting for a shared monotonic variable (such as time, or
the number of times a given keyword has occurred) to reach a critical value. For
example, in the ROI heuristic, the spending rates of losing programs decreases
with time, since their amount spent remains constant. We can thus compute
the next “critical” time that a program would have to stop decrementing and
start incrementing assuming it continued to lose. Similarly, we can compute
the number of auctions for given keyword necessary before its bid would be
decremented to zero and it would have to remain constant at zero. We maintain
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Figure 2.5: Winner Determination Performance
a list of triggers for the relevant shared monotonic variables, sorted by critical
value, that when activated move a bidding program to the appropriate incre-
ment, decrement, or constant list, and insert the appropriate new triggers. This
way, we do work only for programs that win an auction and for triggers whose
critical values have been reached.
2.5 Experiments
To evaluate our fast winner-determination algorithm, we compare the perfor-
mance of four methods for solving the winner-determination problem. The first
method (LP) solves the linear program formulation of the winner-determination
problem. We can prove that this linear program is guaranteed to have an inte-
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Figure 2.6: Reducing Program Evaluation
ger optimum using a theorem of Chva´tal [20], by showing that the rows of the
constraint matrix represent the maximal cliques of a perfect graph. The second
method (H) uses the Hungarian algorithm in a straightforward way to compute
the maximum-weight bipartite matching in the bipartite graph with advertisers
on the left and slots on the right, where the weight of an edge from an advertiser
to a slot is the expected revenue from assigning that slot to that advertiser. The
third method (RH) is our winner-determination technique from Section 2.3.5,
which first reduces the bipartite graph. The fourth method (RHTALU) aug-
ments RH with the techniques for reducing program evaluation from Section 2.4
using the threshold algorithm together with logical updates with triggers.
We used 15 slots in all cases. For simplicity, search queries were generated at
a constant rate, each containing one keywords chosen uniformly at random out
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of 10 keywords. That chosen keyword was given a relevance score of 1 for that
query, while other keywords had a relevance score of 0. All bidders used the
ROI heuristic described in Section 2.2.2. For each keyword, the bidders’ value
for a click was generated uniformly at random between 0 and 50 (subject to
each bidder having at least one non-zero click value). The target spending rates
were chosen uniformly at random between 1 and the bidder’s maximum value
over all keywords. The interval [0.1, 0.9] was partitioned into 15 disjoint inter-
vals, with the (j+ 1)-highest interval associated with slot j. The probability of a
given advertiser getting a click in a given slot was generated uniformly at ran-
dom within that slot’s interval. We used a slight generalization of generalized
second-pricing to charge the advertisers who received clicks.
The entire auction system, including the ROI heuristic, was implemented in
C++. We used the GNU Linear Programming Kit to solve the linear program
via the simplex method.2 We ran the experiments on an AMD Athlon 64 3800+
processor with 1GB of RAM.
Figure 2.5 shows, for each of the four methods, the average time taken per
auction (over 100 auctions) as we increase the number of bidders. We observed
roughly an order of magnitude improvement of the Hungarian method over
naive linear programming solution, and further order of magnitude improve-
ment using our reduced bipartite graph technique. Figure 2.6 compares the per-
formance of methods RH and RHTALU in more detail. It plots the average time
taken per auction (over 1000 auctions) as we increase the number of bidders. We
observe that our techniques for reducing program evaluation from Section 2.4
give a significant further improvement in performance.
2We found that the library’s interior point method was much slower than the simplex
method for our workloads.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we highlight the need for more expressive bidding in sponsored
search auctions. To address this, we propose a framework that empowers ad-
vertisers with an expressive bidding language, and we provide efficient, scal-
able, and parallelizable techniques for performing winner determination given
bids expressed in our language. In the next chapter, we build upon the material
presented here, and discuss several interesting extensions to our techniques, as
well as applications to other advertising scenarios.
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CHAPTER 3
EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS TO OTHER ADVERTISING
AUCTIONS
In this chapter, we present some interesting extensions of the techniques we
developed in the previous chapter. In Section 3.4, we discuss applications of
these techniques to other kinds of advertising auctions.
3.1 Beyond 1-dependence
So far, our results have assumed that the probability that an advertiser receives
a click or a purchase depends only on the slot to which that advertiser was as-
signed. However, it is easy to think of situations where this assumption might
not be true. For example, if the slot assigned to an advertiser for a small com-
pany is just below a very large and popular competitor, then it is likely that the
competitor will receive a substantial portion of user clicks that might otherwise
have gone to the smaller advertiser had the competitor not been present.
Thus, the probability of receiving a click (or a purchase) would depend on
who else displays an ad and in what position. In the worst case, the probability
would depend on the entire slot assignment. The representation of such a gen-
eral probability distribution would be quite large (O(knk)); it is not clear that
we can determine winners much better than with the brute force algorithm that
considers each of the possible
(
n
k
)
k! assignments.
Moreover, advertisers could value two assignments differently even if both
assignments may give the advertiser the same slot. For example, consider two
assignments, both of which assign an advertiser slot 2. However, in the first
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assignment, slot 1 is given to a very famous company, while in the second as-
signment, slot 1 is given to a relatively unknown company. Then the adver-
tiser in slot 2 would naturally prefer the second assignment to the first, since
the famous company poses a serious threat to the advertiser in terms of divert-
ing away clicks. Representing such general valuations would also require large
space (O(knk−1)) in general.
We now consider two extensions to our existing framework, both of which
allow events that are not 1-dependent but, at the same time, do not require us
to store such large distributions and valuations.
3.1.1 Heavyweights and Lightweights
For a given search auction, suppose that the advertisers are classified into either
heavyweights (famous advertisers) or lightweights (relatively unknown advertis-
ers). One way for the search provider to decide which advertisers are heavy-
weights is to select those advertisers with the most clicks so far.
We now allow the probability that a given advertiser gets a click (or a pur-
chase) to depend not only on his slot position, but also on which slots have
heavyweight advertisers and which slots have lightweight advertisers. We also
allow advertisers to place bids that depend on which slots get heavyweights and
which slots get lightweights, in addition to placing bids on click, purchases, and
slot positions as before. Thus, an advertiser might bid 3 cents if he gets slot 2 and
if there is a lightweight advertiser in slot 1. Advertisers could even place more
complex bids, such as bidding on having no heavyweights within 3 slot posi-
tions above or below his slot in addition to having no more than 2 heavyweights
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appear anywhere else. The representation of the probability distributions and
valuations now become O(k2k−1), and does not depend on n.
In order to solve the winner-determination problem, we must find an assign-
ment of slots to advertisers to maximize expected revenue (assuming advertis-
ers pay what they bid) given these new valuations and distributions. Suppose
that we knew exactly which slots get heavyweight advertisers in such a rev-
enue maximizing assignment. We call these slots heavyweight slots, and call the
remaining slots lightweight slots. Then we can solve the winner-determination
problem by simply solving two disjoint maximum-weight bipartite match-
ing problems: one matching the heavyweight advertisers to the heavyweight
slots, and the other matching the lightweight advertisers to lightweight slots.
And if we do this for each possible way to choose heavyweight slots, we can
find the assignment that maximizes expected revenue over all possible assign-
ments. Moreover, the maximum-weight bipartite matching problems for dif-
ferent choices of heavyweight slots can be solved independently and in par-
allel. Therefore, since there are 2k ways to choose heavyweight slots, we can
solve winner determination in time O(2k(n log k + k5)) in series, or in time
O(n log k + k5) in parallel using 2k processing units. Note that the number of
parallel processing units is independent of the number of advertisers n. There-
fore, this approach becomes practical when k is small, say 10 or less, which
seems reasonable in practice.
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3.1.2 Types
Often the search keyword might interest advertisers who are not competing
with each other for sales. For example, a keyword like “games” might inter-
est both sports stores and a video game stores. A large video game advertiser
placed would not drain clicks away from a sports store advertisement placed
just below it as much as it would drain clicks from another video game adver-
tiser. We could therefore extend our model to incorporate the notion of types.
Each advertiser has a type (e.g., ‘video game store’, ‘sports store’, etc.), and if
advertisers of the same type are displayed, they affect each other’s click-through
and purchase rates, whereas advertisers of different types do not affect each oth-
ers click-through and purchase rates.
We now allow the probability that a given advertiser gets a click (or a pur-
chase) to depend on his slot position as well as on the set of slots that have
advertisers who are of the same type. We also allow advertisers to place bids
on the set of slots that are assigned to advertisers of their own type, in addition
to placing bids on click, purchases, and slot positions as before. Thus, an ad-
vertiser might bid 3 cents if he gets slot 2 and if there is a competitor in slots 1
or 3. Typically, an advertiser would bid less for an assignment with many other
advertisers of his type, since these are the advertisers that give him the most
competition. In general, the storage requirement for each advertiser’s valua-
tions and click and purchase probability distributions is O(k2k−1), similar to the
heavyweight-lightweight model.
For winner determination, we generalize the technique employed in com-
puting winners for the heavyweight-lightweight model. That is, for each possi-
ble way to assign types to slots, we run a separate winner-determination com-
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putation, giving us a running time of O(gk(n log k + k5)) in series, or in time
O(n log k + k5) in parallel using gk processing units, where g is the number of
types of advertisers bidding in the auction.
3.2 Beyond the Assignment Restriction
In Chapter 2, we restricted the types of slot allocations to those in which each
advertiser got no more than one slot. In this section, we examine what happens
when we remove this restriction. If we allow advertisers to receive multiple
slots, then the winner-determination problems looks rather easy: we simply
assign each slot to the advertiser with the highest expected revenue in that slot.
Unfortunately, such an approach has an important shortcoming: it ignores
the fact that consecutive slots in an array of slots are often complementary goods.
That is, advertisers might value winning both of two adjacent slots more than
the sum of the values of winning each slot alone. The reason for this is that
adjacent slots give advertisers the advantage of being able to combine the two
slots to create a larger ad, perhaps even using a larger font size, thus making
their advertisement stand out more. In such case, the value of winning multiple
adjacent slots in not additive with respect to the value of winning the individual
slots by themselves. Furthermore, the click-through rate of such an ad in the
larger combined slot is no longer a simple combination of independent click-
through rates from the two adjacent slots. We thus extend our model to allow
for valuations and click and purchase probability distributions on ads that span
blocks of adjacent slots.
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Figure 3.1: List Layout
3.2.1 List Layout
For the moment, we restrict our attention to one-dimensional arrays of slots, as
depicted in Figure 3.1. We call such a layout of advertisement slots a list lay-
out. List layouts are currently used by most of the major search engines such as
Google and Yahoo. In this setting, the blocks are slot intervals, comprising of a set
of one or more adjacent slots in the list. Letm be the number of such slot interval
blocks. Then m ∈ θ(k2), where k is the number of slots. We allow advertisers
to place OR-bids on these slot intervals instead of on individual slots. Accord-
ingly, we add predicates of the form Slotx−y for each 1 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ k that the
advertiser can use in their OR-bid table, in addition to the predicates described
in the previous chapter. The predicate Slotx−y indicates that the advertiser gets
all the slots between and including slots x and y. An example OR-bid table is
depicted in Table 3.1, where the advertiser is willing to pay $2 for slot 1 alone,
$1 for slot 2 alone, but $4 if he gets both slots 1 and 2.
We maintain separate click and purchase probabilities for each advertiser in
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Table 3.1: Interval Bids Table
formula value
Slot1 2
Slot2 1
Slot1−2 4
each slot interval. Therefore, the space requirements for storing an advertiser’s
bids and click- and purchase-probabilities increase from O(k) to O(k2).
Winner Determination
We can solve the winner-determination problem as follows. With each slot in-
terval, we associate the advertiser who would provide the highest expected
revenue if displayed in that interval. This takes time O(nm), where m is the
number of blocks or slot intervals. Now construct a weighted undirected graph
where each node corresponds to a slot interval, and the weight of the node is
the expected revenue associated with the advertiser associated with that slot as
computed above. Two nodes have an edge between them iff the intervals cor-
responding to the nodes intersect. By definition, this graph is an interval graph,
i.e., a graph whose nodes represent intervals, with an edge between two nodes
whose corresponding intervals overlap. If we had a maximum-weight indepen-
dent set of this graph, then we could assign the slot intervals corresponding to
nodes in this independent set to the highest advertisers associated with these
intervals. Such an allocation would be feasible, since the independent set cor-
responds to a set of mutually disjoint intervals, and hence no slot would be
assigned to more than one advertiser. Furthermore, such an allocation would
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be a solution to the winner-determination problem, since a maximum-weight
independent set corresponds to an allocation with maximum expected revenue.
Thus, winner determination boils down to finding the maximum-weight
independent set of an interval graph containing O(k2) nodes. Finding a
maximum-weight independent set of the intersection graph is equivalent to
finding a maximum-weight clique of the complement of the intersection graph.
This is the graph whose nodes are blocks and whose edges connect nodes corre-
sponding to disjoint blocks. We call this the non-intersection graph. Suppose we
could impose directions on the edges of the non-intersection graph such that
they satisfy transitivity. Note that for a list layout, we can do this by directing
the edge between two disjoint intervals from the lower interval to the higher
interval, assuming, without loss of generality, that the list is oriented vertically.
Then we can solve winner determination in time O(m3), where m ∈ θ(k2) is the
number of blocks, using the following algorithm proposed by Even et al. [32].
We proceed inductively, by considering each node in an order corresponding to
any linearization of the topological ordering. For each such node, we compute
the maximum-weight clique in the subgraph induced by all nodes considered
up to this point and containing this node. We can find such a clique by finding
the maximum-weight clique from the set of cliques obtained by unioning the
node under consideration with each of the cliques associated with the preced-
ing nodes that have edges into the node under current consideration. Note that
transitivity guarantees that the union of the node and a clique containing a pre-
ceding node is also a clique. Once we have encountered all nodes, we can find
a clique of overall maximum weight in the non-intersection graph by consider-
ing the clique associated with each node and picking the one with the highest
weight. Furthermore, if we store the slot intervals sorted by their endpoints,
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then we can find a maximum-weight independent set in time O(m) = O(k2)
[37]; hence, winner determination takes time O(nk2).
3.2.2 Other Layouts
We now turn our attention to layouts other than lists. For example, instead of
displaying a vertical list of ads on the right-hand side of the page, the search
provider might display ads all around the border of the page, as depicted in
Figure 3.2. Alternatively, the search provider might display ads as a vertical
list with horizontal rows of ads protruding out of the list in-between various
sections of the page, as depicted in Figure 3.4. With layouts such as these, the
winner determination algorithm described above no longer works, since it is
specific to linear layouts.
Consider the graph whose nodes are slots and whose edges connect nodes
corresponding to adjacent slots. We call this the layout graph of the slots. A
block of slots is any set of slots corresponding to a connected subgraph of the
layout graph. Let m be the number of such blocks. Following the approach
from the previous section, we construct the intersection graph of the blocks that
the advertisers can bid for. This is the graph whose nodes represent blocks and
whose edges connect nodes corresponding to blocks that intersect. As in the
previous section, once we have associated each block with the advertiser who
produces the highest expected revenue in that block, the solution to winner
determination is given by finding a maximum-weight independent set of the
intersection graph and then assigning each block in this independent set to its
associated advertiser.
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Figure 3.2: Ring Layout
Ring Layout
We say that a layout is a ring layout if the layout graph is a simple cycle, as de-
picted in Figure 3.2. In this case, the number of blocks, m is θ(k2), and the inter-
section graph of blocks is a circular arc graph (i.e., one which is the intersection
graph of arcs of a circle), for which finding the maximum-weight independent
set is known to be solvable in time O(m2) [40, 74]. Thus, winner determination
for a ring layout can be solved in time O(nk4).
Grid Layout
We say that a layout is a k1 × k2 grid layout if the layout graph is a k1 × k2
grid, as depicted in Figure 3.3. These present a problem because the number
of blocks is exponential. Even if we restrict ourselves to rectangular blocks, for
which there are θ((k1k2)2) blocks, the problem of finding a maximum-weight
independent set is NP -hard and is in fact inapproximable to within a o(log k)
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Figure 3.3: Grid Layout
factor of optimal by any polynomial-time algorithm unless P = NP [19]. This
means that selling 2-dimensional blocks of screen real-estate is fundamentally
harder than selling blocks in a linear list. Nevertheless, if there a small number
of blocks (e.g., if at least one dimension of the grid is small), then we can use an
O(2m)-time brute force solution, where m is the number of blocks, resulting in
an O(nm+ 2m)-time winner determination algorithm.
If we restrict the assignment of blocks to ones where the blocks form an
axis-aligned recursive subdivision of the grid, then winner determination can
be achieved in polynomial time. Moreover, the restriction to subdivisions leads
to a more comprehensible display of advertisements than if the ads tiled the
grid in an arbitrary manner. We call an independent set of a grid’s intersection
graph a subdivision set if the blocks corresponding to the nodes in the indepen-
dent set form an axis-aligned subdivision of the grid. To solve winner deter-
mination, we must find a maximum-weight subdivision set for the intersection
graph. We can do so with a dynamic programming algorithm that computes
maximum-weight subdivision set for all rectangular sub-grids in increasing or-
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Figure 3.4: Tree Layout
der of area. To find the maximum-weight subdivision set of a given sub-grid,
we try all O(k1 + k2) ways to split the sub-grid into two pieces, and combine the
subdivision sets of the two smaller sub-grids formed by the split. Since there
are O(k12k22) rectangular sub-grids of the original grid, this algorithm runs in
time O((k1k2)2(k1 + k2)).
Tree Layout
The last type of layout we consider a tree layout (i.e., one where the layout graph
is a tree, as in Figure 3.4). Here again, we run into the problem of having ex-
ponentially many blocks. For example, in a star tree, there are Ω(2k−1)-many
blocks, since every subset of leaves defines a connected subgraph of slots when
connected through the central node. Therefore, we restrict our attention to trees
with bounded degree d.
However, even in trees with bounded degree, there can still be exponentially
many blocks. For example, in a full binary tree, just the number of connected
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subgraphs containing the root is Ω(2k/2). This is because each subgraph con-
taining the root is the result of taking the original binary tree and subtracting off
various subtrees, each of which corresponds to a disjoint interval of the θ(k/2)
leaf nodes; and there are Ω(2k/2)-many different ways to partition the leaf nodes
into disjoint intervals. Therefore, in order to limit the number of blocks, we fur-
ther restrict our attention to blocks containing at most b slots. Then the number
of blocks will be O(kdb), since each slot can belong to no more than db blocks,
given that the degree of the tree layout graph is bounded by d and the block size
is bounded by b.
Now the intersection graph of the blocks has a natural tree decomposition
given by associating each node in the tree layout graph with the set of blocks
containing that node. It is easy to see that this tree decomposition yields a
treewidth of O(db), since each slot can belong to no more than db blocks. For
a graph with O(m) nodes and O(db) treewidth, a maximum-weight indepen-
dent set can be found in time O(2dbm) = O(2dbkdb) [15]. Thus, the total time
for winner determination for a tree layout with degree bound d and block size
bound b is O(kdb(n+ 2db)).
3.3 Dealing with Budget Uncertainty
In most existing systems, advertisers can specify a daily budget, which repre-
sents the maximum amount of money the advertiser is willing to spend per
day. The search provider is required to respect this constraint, and must there-
fore never charge an advertiser more than his daily budget on any given day. In
order to perform winner determination correctly, we need to take this budget
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into consideration. What makes this tricky is that the amount of budget remain-
ing is often uncertain. With the high rate of searches, an advertiser may well be
interested in a new auction before he has to pay for his winnings from a previ-
ous auction. Since advertisers pay for clicks only after a user clicks on their ad,
if the user from the first auction has not yet clicked on the advertiser’s ad by the
time the second auction occurs, there will be uncertainty about the amount of
budget that the advertiser has remaining, since the first user may still click on
the ad at some time in the future.
Suppose we were to ignore the budget issue during winner determination
and simply not charge the advertiser if the user clicks after the advertiser’s bud-
get has been depleted. Consider an advertiser who is interested in a popular
keyword, such as music, whose budget is almost exhausted. Until he receives
enough clicks to completely exhaust his budget, we would allow him to bid his
remaining budget on every music-related search query that occurs. He may win
m auctions, but only have enough money in his budget to pay form′ < m clicks.
If he gets more than m′ clicks, payment for the extra clicks would be forgiven.
Thus, the advertiser would get more than his budget’s worth of clicks. This
constitutes lost revenue, since the slots could have been assigned to competing
advertisers who had less chance of depleting their budgets. We now propose a
principled solution to this problem by taking into account the outstanding ads
that are awaiting clicks, and computing appropriately throttled bids for adver-
tisers who are likely to go over budget.
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3.3.1 Throttling Bids
To start with, consider an advertiser i for whom there are no outstanding ads
awaiting clicks from users. Denote the i’s remaining budget, i.e., his daily bud-
get minus the amount he has paid to the search provider for clicks that have
already occurred, as βi. Suppose that in the current round, the advertiser takes
part in mi auctions, and that his current bid for a click is bi. Rather than using bi
directly as his bid, we use a modified bid bˆi instead. If the advertiser can afford
to pay his stated bid of bi for each of the mi auctions, then we take bˆi to be bi;
otherwise, we use the highest possible bid that the advertiser could still afford
to pay for each auction. In other words, we let bˆi = min(bi, βi/mi).
Now suppose that there are some, say li, outstanding ads of advertiser i
that are awaiting clicks. For each outstanding ad j, suppose the price for a
click on that ad was determined to be pij and the probability of that ad getting
clicked (given the time elapsed since the ad was displayed) is ctrj . We make
no assumptions about the value of ctrj , but we point out that it is reasonable
to model ctrj as decreasing over time, and furthermore, that it reaches 0 after a
specified time limit has passed; this will enable us to discard outstanding ads
that have received no clicks in a long time. LetXj be the random variable for the
amount eventually paid for ad j. For any l ∈ {1, . . . , li}, let Sl =
∑l
j=1 Xj . Thus,
the amount of budget remaining once the debts for outstanding ads have been
cleared is max(0, βi − Sli). We would like to take bˆi to be the highest possible
bid that the advertiser could still afford once his debts for outstanding ads have
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been cleared. That is,
bˆi =

bi if Sli < βi −mibi
0 if Sli ≥ βi
(βi − Sli)/mi otherwise
or, written another way, bˆi = min(bi,max(0, βi − Sli)/mi). However, since the
values of the Xjs are uncertain because the ads are still awaiting clicks, we use
the expected value at the time of winner determination. That is, we let bˆi =
E(min(bi,max(0, βi − Sli)/mi)).
3.3.2 Computing Bounds for Throttled Bids
Let ωl denote
∑l
j=1 pij , where pij is the price for a click on the jth outstand-
ing ad. Note that Sli ≤ ωli , since each Xj is either pij with probability ctrj ,
or else is 0 with the remaining probability. Thus, if ωli ≤ βi − mibi, then
bˆi = bi. Otherwise, if ωli > βi − mibi, we can compute bˆi as follows. Note that
E(min(bi,max(0, βi − Sli)/mi)) = E(min(mibi, βi −min(βi, Sli)))/mi. Thus, in or-
der to compute bˆi, we can compute the distribution of min(βi, Sli) and then take
the expected value of min(mibi, βi−min(βi, Sli)) over that distribution. This takes
time O(min(2li , βi)), assuming that βi is written in the lowest denomination of
currency. However, observe that during the winner-determination phase, we
do not need the precise values of bˆi. We simply need the ability to compare bˆi
with bˆi′ for advertisers i and i′ in order to find the top k advertisers. Of course,
once winner determination is over, we will need the precise values of bˆi for the
winning advertisers in order to compute the prices for clicks. But there are only
k winning advertisers at this point, so the amount of computation is a lot less
than computing the precise bˆi values for all n advertisers.
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Now, in order to compare the bˆi and bˆi′ , we use Hoeffding bounds to compute
successively tighter upper and lower bounds for bˆi and bˆi′ until the upper bound
is lower than the lower bound for the other at which point we can resolve the
comparison test with certainty. In order to do this, notice that bˆi can be rewritten
as
bi Pr(Sli < βi −mibi) +
1
mi
E((βi − Sli)1βi−mibi≤Sli<βi)
We will denote upper and lower probability bounds as Pr(. . . ) and Pr(. . . )
respectively, and we denote upper and lower expectation bounds as E(. . . ) and
E(. . . ) respectively. Let µl denote E(Sl) =
∑l
j=1 ctrjpij by linearity of expecta-
tion, and let σl denote
√
Var(Sl) =
√∑l
j=1 ctrj(1− ctrj)pi2j . Using Hoeffding’s
inequality [41], which upper-bounds the probability that the sum of bounded
independent random deviates from its expected value, we can derive the fol-
lowing bounds for Pr(Sl < x) for any x > 0,
Pr(Sl < x) =

1 if ωli ≤ x
max(0.5, 1− exp(−2(x− µli)2/
∑li
j=1 pi
2
j )) if µli ≤ x < ωli
0 if x < µli ≤ ωli
and
Pr(Sl < x) =
 1 if µli ≤ xmin(0.5, exp(−2(µli − x)2/∑lij=1 pi2j )) if x < µli ≤ ωli
Using these bounds, we can derive bounds for Pr(x ≤ Sl < y) as Pr(x ≤
Sl < y) = max(0,min(1,Pr(Sl < y) − Pr(Sl < x))) and Pr(x ≤ Sl < y) =
max(0,min(1,Pr(Sl < y) − Pr(Sl < x))). Now for 0 < x < y, we can bound
E(Sl1x≤Sl<y) from above and below by xPr(x ≤ Sl < y) and y Pr(x ≤ Sl < y) re-
spectively. Using the bounds that we have just derived, we can bound the value
of bi Pr(Sli < βi − mibi) + βimi Pr(βi − mibi ≤ Sli < βi) + 1mi E(Sli1βi−mibi≤Sli<βi)
and hence that of bˆi.
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If the bounds for bˆi and bˆi′ as computed above are insufficient to decide the
comparison, we can expand Pr(Sl < x) and E(Sl1x≤Sl<y) in terms of expressions
involving Sl−1, pil, and ctrl to get tighter bounds. We do this repeatedly until the
bounds are tight enough to decide the comparison. Pr(Sl < x) expands to
ctrl Pr(Sl−1 < x− pil) + (1− ctrl) Pr(Sl−1 < x)
and E(Sl1x≤Sl<y) expands to
ctrl E(Sl−11x−pil≤Sl−1<y−pil)
+ ctrlpil Pr(x− pil ≤ Sl−1 < y − pil))
+ (1− ctrl) E(x ≤ Sl−1 < y)
We order the random variables Xj in increasing order of pij . We expand out
variables of high pij values first, thus quickly eliminating their appearance in
the Hoeffding bounds which as can be seen from the equations above leads to
tighter bounds. Note that, in the worst case, the running time for getting a
precise value for bˆi is still O(max(2li , βi)), but our technique allows us to ter-
minate early once the bounds are tight enough for the purpose of comparison.
Furthermore, we can cache the bounds for comparison with other bˆi′s and for
computing the precise computation of bˆi should advertiser i be one of the top k
advertisers.
3.3.3 Related Work
Related to our work on uncertain budgets, Aggarwal and Hartline propose a
related auction known as the knapsack auction, where bidders want to place
items of varying sizes in a knapsack of a given capacity [4]. They suggest that
this auction can be used to run a single auction to sell advertisement slots for the
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entire day where each advertiser’s budget runs out after receiving exactly one
click. In contrast to our approach, their auction fixes the outcome ex ante at the
start of the day. Re, Suciu, et al. propose a technique they term ‘multisimulation’
to find the top-k most probable tuples in the result of a query to probabilistic
database [67]. They do this by running Monte-Carlo simulations for all tuples
and scheduling the simulations so as to quickly eliminate unlikely contenders.
3.4 Application to Other Settings
Our algorithms are applicable to more than just web search. We now discuss
two other kinds of advertising auctions that benefit from the techniques we have
developed so far.
3.4.1 Massively Multiplayer Online Games
Beyond web search, another setting to which sponsored ad auctions can be ap-
plied is massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs). In-game advertising
in these games could prove to be a highly effective advertising platform; re-
cent studies that included eye tracking have shown that 75% of gamers engage
with at least one ad per minute across most, but not all, game types, and 81%
of gamers engage at least every other minute [38]. Advertising in the form of
product placement and in-game billboards is already making its way into the
current generation of games, and in-game ad spending could reach $1.8 billion
by 2010 [72].
We now show how to adapt our sponsored search auction framework to
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the auction of in-game billboards to advertisers. The billboard ads shown to a
player do not have to be generated statically. The game can select which ad to
display dynamically (via an auction) as long as it does so before the billboard is
rendered on the player’s screen. There are a number of ways to determine when
to run the ad auction. For example, it can be done just before drawing the first
frame in which the billboard is visible. Or it can be done by having the level-
designer manually place trigger areas on the game map that activate the routine
for ad selection. Ideally, the trigger areas would be placed on the map so that
the player would have to cross the trigger area before the billboard comes into
view. Well-developed techniques such as binary space partitioning [78] can help
to automate the process of identifying trigger areas. No matter which method is
used to determine when to run the auction, there is a requirement of fast winner
determination in order to keep the game running in real-time.
In order to see how bidding would work in the MMOG setting, we need to
identify the factors that affect how much an advertiser values being displayed
on a given billboard. We model four such factors: player profile, billboard
prominence, ad exposure, and player engagement.
Player Profile
Since the advertisements do not affect the gameplay, it would be acceptable for
two players looking at the same virtual billboard simultaneously to see different
ads. Thus, the game could display different ads for different players even in a
shared environment. This opens the door to targeted advertising. Advertisers
can bid differently for different player profiles. Accurate statistics about players’
in-game activities are already maintained by game servers in order to track play-
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ers’ progress. These statistic can be used to get a picture of the type of player.
For example, Bartle [12] proposes four prototypes: explorers, killers, achievers,
and socializers. A player is given scores, called Bartle quotients, in each of the
four types. These Bartle quotients can be used by advertisers to distinguish tar-
get market segments. For example, advertisers selling fiction books might bid
higher for their ad to be displayed to players who have high explorer quotients.
Even more useful, MMOGs contain well-defined social networks such as guilds
(large groups of players who share similar goals or virtual professions), parties
(smaller groups of players who go on quests together), and personal contact
lists (other players who are friends of a player and who often socialize with the
player in the game). These social networks can be mined to predict whether or
not a new player falls into a certain market segment based on whether or not his
friends and fellow guild-members do. Furthermore, all in-game chat is logged
and so can be mined for keywords that indicate potential interest in the prod-
ucts that the advertisers sell. Of course, the extent to which the social networks
and chat transcripts can be used to build the player profile for advertisers is
subject to the privacy policies of the game. However, one could well imagine
ad-supported versions of the game that allow players to play for free provided
they agree to sharing their in-game social data with advertisers.
Billboard Prominence
One of the most important sources of value of virtual billboard advertising to
an advertiser comes from impressions. The location of the billboard within the
virtual world can affect the amount of impact its ads can have. Billboards places
at eye-level within the gameworld tend to have greater impact. Too many
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billboards cluttered together can reduce the amount of impression that an ad
makes. Beyond spatial positioning of the billboard, gameplay-related distrac-
tions present at the location can also affect impressions. For example, if a bill-
board is placed in an area where there is a lot of intense and immersive game-
play (such as combat with a monster), then the player is not likely to pay much
attention to the ad displayed on that billboard. Thus, we can assign each bill-
board a prominence score, based on the visibility of its spatial location and on the
amount of distractions present at the location (e.g., other billboards, enemies,
etc.). The prominence score can be calculated just before the auction for a bill-
board (or set of billboards) begins, based on the number of enemies near the
billboard at the time the player enters a trigger area, and based on the visibility
the billboard would have for a player approaching from the trigger area.
Ad Exposure
Even if an ad is placed on a prominent billboard with few distractions around
it, the player may still not see the ad because he just happened to be facing the
wrong way. In determining the amount of exposure an ad has to a player, games
have a great advantage over web search. It is easy to accurately measure and
record various properties that directly affect an ad’s exposure. For example, one
can measure how long the ad is in the player’s field of vision, whether or not
the player’s view of the ad was obstructed by another object, what angle the ad
was viewed from, whether the player was engaged in some other activity (e.g.,
cycling through his inventory) while the ad was in view, etc. We can combine
these measurements into a single exposure score that is accumulated over the
course of the game. Note that the exposure score is known only after the player
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has quit the game and is therefore uncertain at the time of the ad auction.
Player Engagement
Beyond measuring the exposure that virtual billboard ads provide, one may be
tempted to implement a mechanism analogous to clicks in sponsored search
auctions to take the player to the advertiser’s homepage in a separate browser
window. However, care must be taken so as to minimize the intrusiveness of
such a mechanism on the gameplay. The mechanism should allow players to
express interest in an ad, but should not entail a substantial distraction from
the immediacy of gameplay. We can use the aiming/targeting system already
built into these games for such a non-intrusive mechanism. The idea is to allow
players to bookmark an ad by “shooting” at the ad. The number of shots fired
indicate how much the ad interests the player. Upon quitting the game, the
player is then presented with a splash screen containing the list of all the ads he
bookmarked, sorted by the extent of his interest.
Adapting Our Auction Framework
In the setting of advertising on in-game billboards, the billboards are analogous
to slots. The exposure and engagement scores are similar to clicks and purchases
in that they are unknown at auction time, and therefore the game must main-
tain distributions of exposure and engagement scores for each billboard. These
distributions can be based on historical data. An auction for a set of billboards
is run when a player enters their trigger area.
As before, advertisers submit programs to bid on their behalf, and these pro-
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Table 3.2: Bids Table for In-Game Advertising
formula value
. . . . . .
Billboard2 ∧ Exp(0.8,1] ∧ Eng (0.6,1] 3
. . . . . .
grams are given access to variables relevant to the player’s profile (e.g., Bartle
types, guild, etc.) and to the current prominence scores for the set of billboards.
Now, instead of of bidding on slots, clicks, and purchases, these programs out-
put bids on billboards as well as on intervals of exposure and engagement
scores. For examples, an advertiser can bid 3 cents for the second-most promi-
nent billboard if exposure ends up being greater than 0.8 and engagement ends
up being greater than 0.6. This would be represented by a bids table as shown
in Table 3.2.
The game then computes winners so as to maximize the expected revenue
assuming that advertisers pay what they bid. We assume once again that the
only billboard that affects the exposure and engagement scores for an advertiser
is the billboard to which he is assigned. Then we can use our algorithm from
Section 2.3 to solve winner determination efficiently. Moreover, our techniques
for reducing program evaluation from Section 2.2.2 still apply in this setting.
3.4.2 Map Routes
To illustrate the use of our more advanced techniques, consider selling adver-
tisements on online map-route searches. In a map-route search, users submit a
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start address and a destination address; then the search provider returns a page
displaying driving directions from the start to the destination, along with an
map displaying this route.
We can display ads on map-route search result pages by highlighting seg-
ments along the route such that when the user clicks on or hovers over a high-
lighted segment, an advertiser’s ad will be displayed in a balloon similar to
the balloons used to expand pushpin ads on local business searches in Google
Maps. Highlighted segments that are adjoining each other can be distinguished
by the use of different colors. Moreover, the advertisers’ ads can also be dis-
played alongside the appropriate set of steps in the driving directions.
Analogous to specifying a set of search phrases in a regular sponsored search
auction, advertisers now specify either a set of addresses and a radius around
the addresses, which are then matched to the resulting route in order to de-
termine the set of competing advertisers. Advertisers might also specify more
complex conditions, such as being a certain number of miles away from the start
or destination address. For example, a gas station could choose to advertise only
on map routes that start about 300 miles away and pass by the gas station. In
addition to specifying addresses, advertisers could also specify search phrases,
such as “beach” or “museum”, which could then be matched to addresses. In
this way, a swimwear store in an inland town could advertise on map searches
from that town to any location near a beach.
To sell segments on a map route, we first partition the route into a sequence
of unit segments. These unit segments are analogous to slots in a list layout.
Advertisers then bid on blocks (i.e., intervals) of unit segments, just as in Sec-
tion 3.2.1.
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In addition to allowing advertisers to bid on segments, we can also employ
the techniques proposed in Section 3.1.2 to allow advertisers to set different bids
based on the number of competing advertisers of the same type displayed on
the map. For example, a swimwear store might bid much higher if it is the only
swimwear store displayed on the route, since one swimsuit is usually enough
for most people.
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CHAPTER 4
SHARING WORK BETWEEN AUCTIONS
In this chapter, we look at the problem of sharing work between auctions. We
start by examining how to use shared top-k aggregation when solving winner
determination problems for multiple auctions. We provide an inapproximabil-
ity result for this problem. We then turn our attention to sharing other types of
aggregates that could appear in advertisers’ bidding programs, and we extend
our analysis to give a complete characterization of the complexity of shared ag-
gregation for commutative aggregates in terms of the algebraic properties of the
aggregation operator.
4.1 Shared Winner Determination
Given the high volume of searches performed each day, several search queries
arrive nearly simultaneously at any given time. This presents an opportunity
for sharing the work of winner determination among several sponsored search
auctions. In order to identify the work that can be shared across auctions, we
need to first describe how winner determination is solved for an individual auc-
tion.
4.1.1 Separability and Winner Determination
As mentioned in previous chapters, the probability that a user clicks on an ad-
vertiser’s ad depends on, among other things, the content of the ad and the slot
in which the advertisement is displayed. (For example, studies have shown that
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Table 4.1: Separable Click-Through Rates
ctrij slot 1 slot 2
advertiser A 0.36 0.24
advertiser B 0.33 0.22
advertiser C 0.39 0.26
ads are more likely to be clicked on if they are displayed in slots at the top of
a vertical list of slots than if they were placed lower in the list [65].) For the
moment, we make the separability assumption, described in Section 2.3.3, in
accord with the earlier literature [5, 3, 30, 81]. In Chapter 2, we showed that
winner determination could be done efficiently even without assuming separa-
bility. In fact, the techniques for sharing computation that we develop here can
be applied to the winner determination algorithm proposed in Chapter 2. We
return to this issue in Section 4.3.
Assuming separability, winner determination can be solved in time linear
in the number of advertisers for any given auction as follows. Recall that the
separability assumption states that the probability that a given ad receives a
click when displayed in a given slot can be written as the product of two fac-
tors, one that depends only on the advertiser and the other that depends only
on the slot position. This probability, denoted as ctrij , is known as the click-
through rate of advertiser i in slot j. So the separability assumption says that
ctrij = ci × dj , where ci is the advertiser-specific factor and dj is the slot-specific
factor. Table 4.1 shows an example of separable click-through rates that can
be decomposed into advertiser-specific factors and slot-specific factors, as de-
picted in Table 4.2. Since each ctrij is separable as ci×dj , winner determination
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Table 4.2: Advertiser-Specific and Slot-Specific Factors
A B C
ci 1.2 1.1 1.3
slot 1 slot 2
dj 0.3 0.2
Table 4.3: Bids and Weighted Bids
A B C
bi 14 15 10
bici 16.8 16.5 13
is equivalent to finding one-to-one mapping α from slots to advertisers so as to
maximize
∑
j∈[k] bα(j)cα(j)dj . Then α dictates the allocation of slots: slot j is as-
signed to advertiser α(j). For example, consider the click-through rates defined
by Table 4.1. Now suppose the advertisers bids are as depicted in Table 4.3.
Then winner determination assigns slot 1 to advertiserA and slot 2 to advertiser
B. Without loss of generality, assume that the slots are ordered such that slot
j has the jth highest value of dj . We can then solve the winner-determination
problem by simply finding the advertisers with the top k values of bici and set-
ting α(j) to the advertiser with the j-highest value of bici. This requires a single
scan over the bicis, keeping track of the top k advertisers.
Having described how winner determination works for a single auction, we
turn our attention to sharing the work of winner determination between multi-
ple auctions that occur in the same round. The choice of granularity of a round
is left to the system designer. While choosing a coarser granularity will lead
to higher sharing between auctions (since more searches will occur per round),
and thus greater overall efficiency, it will also increase the latency (the time the
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user has to wait before obtaining her search results). Studies have shown that
users tolerate median latencies of up to 2.2 seconds without much adverse per-
ception of search quality, but median latencies of about 3.6 seconds or more are
considered too long [70].
Under the separability assumption, winner determination amounts to find-
ing the advertisers with the top k values of bici where k is the number of slots
and bi is advertiser i’s bid and ci is the advertiser-specific factor of advertiser i’s
click-through rate. Thus, if the same set of advertisers take part in two auctions
in the same round, then slots would be awarded in the same way in both. How-
ever, not every bidder takes part in every auction. An advertiser can specify a
set of bid phrases. If the search query does not match one of the advertiser’s bid
phrases, then his ad is not entered into the auction.
In determining whether a query matches an advertiser’s bid phrase, we as-
sume that the two-stage method proposed in [66] is used, where the search
query is first mapped into a lower-dimensional space of bid phrases and is then
matched to the advertisers’ bid phrases using exact match. Accordingly, if a bid
phrase does indeed match some query, then we must find the advertisers with
the top k values of bici whose set of bid phrase contain the bid phrase. This is
where we can share work between the different auctions.
For example, suppose that the search queries “hiking boots” and “high-
heels” occur in the same round. There might be several general shoe stores
that specify both queries as bid phrases. However there might be a few sports
stores that specify “hiking boots” but not “high-heels”, while a few high-end
fashion accessory stores might only be interested in “high-heels” queries. Sup-
pose there are 200 general shoe stores, 40 sports stores, and 30 upscale fashion
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stores. Finding the top k advertisers for each of the two phrases separately re-
quires us to scan through 240 and 230 advertisers respectively. However, if we
find the top k advertisers among the general shoe stores, the top k among sports
stores, and the top k among the fashion stores (which requires looking at 200,
30, and 40 advertisers), we can then merge the first and second top k lists to find
the top k advertisers interested in “hiking boots”, and the first and third top-k
lists to find the top k advertisers interested in “high-heels”. Merging in this way
allows us to scan 40% fewer advertisers.
This suggests the use of merging of two top-k lists as a primitive aggregation
operation that we employ to build shared plans that successively aggregate the
bici values of all the advertisers so as to find the aggregates corresponding to the
sets of advertiser interested in each bid phrase while minimizing the number
of aggregate operations performed. Thus, the plan we build will be a DAG
where each leaf node represents an advertiser, and each internal node has in-
degree 2 and represents a top-k aggregation operator that aggregates the top k
advertisers from the two upstream nodes.
One further issue that complicates sharing is that not all bid phrases occur
in a given round. Thus a single shared plan may not be optimal in all rounds.
Unfortunately, coming up with a new plan on the fly at every round based is
not practical given the latency requirement of winner determination. Instead,
we try to find a single plan offline that works well ‘on average’. To formalize
this, we assume that the event that a bid phrase occurs in a round is an indepen-
dent Bernoulli trial whose probability is known. We call the probability that bid
phrase q occurs its search rate and denote it as srq. We then try to find the plan
involving pairwise top-k aggregation that computes the aggregate for each bid
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phrase, and minimizes the expected number of nodes materialized per round. A
node is materialized in a given round if it is used to compute the result for a bid
phrase that occurs in that round. In other words, a node is materialized if there
is a path in the plan’s DAG from that node to some node corresponding to a
bid phrase query node. Therefore the probability of node v being materialized
is 1−∏q:v vq(1− srq) where v  q represents the statement that node v is used
in the computation of the aggregate query corresponding to bid phrase q in the
shared plan. Without loss of generality, we normalize the cost of the aggrega-
tion operator to 1. Then, by linearity of expectation, the total expected cost of a
plan is ∑
v
(
1−
∏
q:v q
(1− srq)
)
.
4.1.2 Shared Top-k Aggregation
In this section, we examine the problem at the core of sharing winner determi-
nation: optimizing shared top-k aggregation plans. To this end, we develop a
framework for shared aggregation using an abstract aggregation operator spec-
ified by a set of algebraic properties that the operator satisfies. We show that
finding an optimal shared plan for our abstraction of the top-k aggregation op-
erator is not only NP-hard, but is in fact inapproximable. The construction used
in the proof motivates our heuristic for finding a good shared plan in the next
section.
We start out by defining our notion of an abstract aggregation operator and
its associated aggregate queries. An abstract aggregate operator is simply a
binary function ⊕: Z × Z → Z, for some set of values Z (e.g., Z, N), such that
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the cost of evaluating ⊕ is constant. Given the abstract operator ⊕, aggregation
queries are represented by⊕-expressions which are obtained by starting out with
a set of variables X and closing off under the binary ⊕ operator. An example of
an aggregation query is (x ⊕ y) ⊕ z, where x, y, z are variables that take values
in Z. In our setting, each variable represents the bid of some advertiser, and the
values of the variables change rapidly since advertisers are constantly updating
their bids using external search engine optimizers [51] or automated bidding
programs [58] in order to achieve complex advertising goals such as staying
in a given slot during specific hours of the day, staying a certain number of
slots above a competitor, dividing one’s budget across a set of keywords so as
to maximize the return-on-investment, etc. [17, 51, 63]. We therefore have to
evaluate our aggregate queries at each round since the variables are constantly
taking on different values.
Without using information about the algebraic properties of ⊕, we can only
share work between queries in a rather limited manner by reusing the results of
sub-expressions used to compute the queries. For example, we can share work
between x ⊕ y and (x ⊕ y) ⊕ z by re-using the value of x ⊕ y (which was com-
puted for the first query) during the computation of the second. But if we take
advantage of the various algebraic properties that ⊕ satisfies, we can increase
the amount of shared computation. For example, if ⊕ is commutative then we
can share work between the queries x ⊕ y and (y ⊕ x) ⊕ z by aggregating the
value of z with the value of the first query in order to compute the value of the
second.
Let Iq be the set of advertisers interested in bid phrase q. Then an ⊕-
expression representing the aggregate query for bid phrase q is ⊕i∈Iq bi (we
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assume left-associativity, allowing us to omit parentheses) where bi is the vari-
able containing advertiser i’s bid. Throughout this subsection, we assume that
all bid phrases occur in every round with probability 1 (i.e., srq = 1 for each bid
phrase q). The hardness results presented here therefore extend to the case when
the srqs are arbitrary. Sharing winner determination then amounts to finding a
shared top-k aggregation plan that produces, for each phrase q, the top-k ag-
gregate of the bids of advertisers listed in Xq. Recall that the top-k aggregation
operator is the binary function that takes in two k-lists (i.e., lists of size at most
k) and outputs a k-list of the top k elements of the union of the two input lists.
Notice that this operator is clearly associative, commutative, and idempotent
(i.e., aggregating a list L with itself returns L). It also has an identity element,
namely, the empty list which, when aggregated with any k-list, returns that list.
We therefore abstract the top-k aggregator using an abstract aggregator ⊕ satis-
fying the following algebraic properties.
A1. ∀ a . ∀ b . ∀ c . a ⊕ (b ⊕ c) = (a ⊕ b) ⊕ c (associativity)
A2. ∃ e . ∀ a . a ⊕ e = e ⊕ a = a (identity)
A3. ∀ a . a ⊕ a = a (idempotence)
A4. ∀ a . ∀ b . a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a (commutativity)
For convenience of notation, let A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}. A characterizes the al-
gebraic notion of a semilattice with identity element, and so our results in this
subsection apply to any meet or join operator, such as min, max, and Bloom-filter
unions and intersections [14], etc.
Two⊕-expressions e and e′ areA-equivalent iff e = e′ is provable in first-order
logic plus A. Now we can formally define the notion of a shared plan. Given
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a set E consisting of ⊕-expressions over X , an A-plan for E is a DAG satisfying
the following properties:
1. each node is labeled with an ⊕-expression and has in-degree either 0 or 2,
2. each node with in-degree 0 is labeled with a variable x ∈ X ,
3. each node with in-degree 2 is labeled with an ⊕-expression e ⊕ e′,
4. each e ∈ E is A-equivalent to the label of some node.
The total cost of an A-plan is the number of nodes with non-zero in-degree in
the graph (i.e., those nodes representing top-k aggregation operators). Now we
can formally state the shared aggregation problem as follows. Given a set E of
⊕-expressions over X , find the min-cost plan for computing each e ∈ E.
We assume, without loss of generality, that no two ⊕-expressions in E are
A-equivalent and also that no⊕-expression in E isA-equivalent to any variable
x ∈ X since we can identify such expressions upfront and remove such dupli-
cates. We define the base cost of an A-plan to be |E|. Since every expression E
must be the label of a non-leaf node of a plan for E, every plan for E has cost
at least |E|. What is interesting is the cost of the plan over and above |E|. We
define the extra cost of an A-plan to be the total cost of the plan minus |E|. The
nodes contributing to extra cost are the partial results that are used to compute
the final set of aggregates. Note that minimizing the extra cost is equivalent to
minimizing the total cost of anA-plan. Later on, when we discuss inapproxima-
bility, we will measure competitive ratio in terms of extra cost instead of total
cost, since the base cost for all A-plans for E is the same and is unavoidable.
First we state the following lemma, which is easy to prove.
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Lemma 4.1.1 Two ⊕-expressions over a set of variables X are A-equivalent iff the set
of variables appearing in the two expressions are equal. In particular, e1 ⊕ e2 and e are
A-equivalent iff the set of variables appearing in e is equal to the union of the sets of
variables appearing in e1 and e2.
Next, we show that finding an optimal shared plan is NP-hard for our ab-
straction of the top-k aggregator.
Theorem 4.1.2 Finding a min-cost A-plan for E is NP-hard, where E is a finite set of
⊕-expressions over a finite set of variables X .
Proof We reduce this to the set-cover problem, which is well-known to be NP-
complete [48]. Recall that, in the set-cover problem, we are given a finite ‘uni-
versal’ set U , a finite collection S of subsets of U such that ∪S∈S S = U , and
an integer k, and we must determine whether there is some S ′ ⊆ S such that
|S ′| ≤ k, and such that ∪S∈S′ S = U .
Consider any instance of set cover. We can convert this into an instance of the
problem of finding a minimum-cost A-plan using the following construction.
We create a variable for each element of the universal set. That is, we set X =
U . For each S ⊆ X , we define a ‘canonical’ ⊕-expression eS as follows. Let
<X be an arbitrary strict ordering on the variables in X . If S = {x1, . . . , xk} is
a nonempty set of variables in X , such that x1 <X · · · <X xk, then eS is the
expression x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xk with implicit left-associativity. (Since ⊕ is associative
by assumption, we do not need parentheses here.) eS thus represents the query
that aggregates the variables in S in ascending <X-order.
Now let the set of⊕-expressionsE = {eU}∪{eS : S ∈ S}. That is, we have an
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⊕-expression corresponding to each set in S and one extra ⊕-expression corre-
sponding to the universal set. Note that this construction can be done in polyno-
mial time, assuming <X is represented as a linear list of variables in ascending
order.
Now suppose that we have a polynomial-time algorithm for finding the min-
cost A-plan for E. Let G be the (DAG) plan returned by the algorithm. Let ≤
be the binary relation on nodes in G defined by u < v iff G contains a directed
(possibly zero-length) path from u to v. For each e ∈ E, let ue be the node
labeled with the ⊕-expression that is A-equivalent to e. Note that checking
whether two ⊕-expressions are A-equivalent can be done in polynomial time
by Lemma 4.1.1. Let V = {u : u ≤ ueU} and W = {u : ∃S ∈ S . u ≤ ueS}. That is,
V is the set of all nodes that have a path to the node labeled eU and W is the set
of all nodes that have a path to a node labeled eS for some S ∈ S . So V induces
an arborescence rooted at ueU that represents the plan’s pairwise aggregation
computation of eU . Similarly, the DAG induced by V represents the plan’s com-
putation of the⊕-expressions in {eS : S ∈ S}. Let Z be the set of nodes in V ∩W
that have an edge into W \ V . The nodes in Z are the ones with paths leading
both to ueU and ueS for some S ∈ S . For each node z ∈ Z, let Sz be the set in S
such that z = ueSz . Note that Z forms a cut of the arborescence induced by V ,
since V and W have the same leaf nodes (namely, the nodes labeled by the vari-
ables in X). Therefore, by Lemma 4.1.1, {Sz : z ∈ Z} is a set cover of U , since eU
is formed by aggregating the nodes in Z since Z cuts the arborescence induced
by V . Since the plan generated by the algorithm was minimal, this must be a
minimal set cover of U , otherwise we could have replaced the nodes in V \W
by aggregating the smaller set cover, which would have produced a plan with
fewer nodes. 
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Finally, we extend the idea behind the construction in the previous proof to
show that finding an optimal shared plan for our abstraction of the top-k aggre-
gator is, in fact, hard to approximate to within less than a logarithmic factor of
optimal.
Theorem 4.1.3 There is no polynomial-time algorithm that finds a shared plan whose
extra cost is within a log n factor of optimum unless P = NP .
Proof We follow the same construction as the proof of Theorem 4.1.2, except
that we close the query expressions off under sub-expressions before adding
the universal set query. This ensures that the only extra nodes we add are for
computing the universal set query, which as we showed in the proof of Theo-
rem 4.1.2 corresponds to finding a minimal set cover. Then the theorem follows
directly from the fact that minimal set cover is not approximable to within a
log n factor of optimal [55]. 
As we mentioned previously, these complexity results apply to the case
where the queries are probabilistic as well. We also point out that presence or
absence of the identity axiom A2 does not have any affect on our complexity of
aggregation. This is mainly due to the fact that we are aggregating variables, not
constant elements, and therefore we cannot exploit the properties of the identity
element since the variables may or may not contain the identity element at any
given round.
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Greedy Algorithm
In the previous section we proved that finding an optimal shared plan for top-k
aggregation between multiple auctions is inapproximable to within a log n fac-
tor even for the special case where all queries occur with certain probability. We
now propose a heuristic for finding a shared aggregation plan for multiple prob-
abilistic queries. Our approach consists of two stages: identifying fragments,
and aggregating across fragments.
Identifying fragments. In the first stage, we group together all variables
that occur in the same set of query expressions. We associate with each variable
a bit string of length m, where the ith bit indicates whether or not the variable
occurs in the i query expression. Then we group together all variables that are
associated with the same bit string. These groups are equivalence classes of
variables and are called fragments in [52]. Note that even though there are 2m
possible fragments, only O(n) will be non-empty since there are n variables. We
can safely aggregate elements within a fragment since no sharing occurs across
fragments, since fragments are equivalence classes. This step itself provides
some basic multiquery optimization since no fragment is computed twice. It is
not hard to see that this step takes O(mn log n) time; the log n factor comes from
having to index the fragments by bit string to identify groups of fragments.
Alternatively, a hash table of bit strings could be used for grouping.
Aggregating across fragments. In the second stage, we use a greedy heuris-
tic to complete the plan that was started out by aggregating together all the
nodes within each fragments. We say that an A-plan is incomplete if it does not
compute all query expressions, i.e., if there is some query expression that is not
equivalent to the label of any node in the plan. We can always complete an
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incomplete plan by finding a set cover of the missing query nodes from the col-
lection of existing nodes. Note that we are associating nodes with the set of
variables mentioned in the ⊕-expression labeling the node according to Theo-
rem 4.1.1. Also note that we use the term ‘set cover’ to mean a cover whose
union exactly equals the target set instead of just being a superset of the target
set. This usage of the term is made without loss of generality with respect to
earlier complexity results.
Suppose, for the moment, that all queries occur with probability 1 at each
round. Then the optimal way to complete the plan without any further sharing
would be to find a minimum set cover C of each of the missing queries, and to
aggregate together all the nodes in C using an arbitrary binary tree, all of which
use |C| − 1 nodes. Thus, the cost of completing the plan without sharing costs
is
∑
q(|Cq| − 1), where Cq is the size of the minimal set cover for query node q.
This motivates our greedy heuristic, which works as follows.
At every step, we find two nodes that would aggregate together to form a
new node that would lead to the highest decrease in
∑
q |Cq| per unit extra cost
of computing the new aggregate node. We call the decrease in
∑
q |Cq| resulting
from aggregating a pair of existing nodes the coverage gain of the pair. Note
that the extra cost of creating a new aggregate node is 1 unless the aggregate
is equivalent to a query expression, in which case the extra cost is 0 since the
query node would have had to be computed anyway, and would therefore have
counted toward the base cost. If there are multiple pairs of nodes that would
cover some previously uncovered query, then we pick the pair with the highest
coverage gain. The intuition is that the faster we cover all the query nodes, the
faster the plan gets completed, and hence the fewer the extra nodes that are
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used.
Unfortunately, as the reader might have noticed, we run into a problem if
we try to carry out the heuristic as stated above. In order to pick the pair of
nodes with the highest coverage gain, we need to first calculate the minimum
cover for each query node from the existing set of nodes. But as we saw in
Section 4.1.2, minimum set cover is an NP-hard problem, and is, in fact, not
approximable to within a log n + 1 factor. Therefore, we cannot use the real
set cover in measuring coverage gain; instead, we use the cover prescribed by
the greedy covering algorithm, which works as follows. Until the target set is
covered, repeatedly pick the feasible set that covers the maximum number of
as-yet-uncovered elements. It is known that this greedy algorithm produces a
cover within a 1 + log n factor of optimal [45]. In fact, the greedy algorithm
performs even better during the early decisions: the greedy algorithm achieves
a competitive ratio logarithmic in |S|, where S is the largest cardinality set in the
collection [45] (in our context, this is the size of the largest set associated with
an existing node in the incomplete plan). We call the total size of the covers of
all the query nodes as prescribed by the greedy covering algorithm the greedy
coverage. Since we always decrease the greedy coverage at each step, we run
for at most
∑
q |Xq| steps, where Xq is the set of variables mentioned in query
q. Each step requires finding a greedy cover for each query node. So the total
running time is polynomial in
∑
q |Xq|.
So far in this subsection, we have assumed that all queries appears at each
round. However, as we described earlier, in our application, each query occurs
independently with some probability. We therefore extend the algorithm to deal
with this probabilistic setting by replacing the notion of coverage gain with ex-
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pected greedy coverage gain. The expected greedy coverage gain of a pair of nodes
is the decrease in expected total greedy coverage of queries (i.e.,
∑
q srq|Cq|,
where srq is the probability of the aggregate query q occurring) resulting from
aggregating that pair of nodes. Thus, the algorithm favors the covering and
sharing of queries that are more probable over rare queries.
To summarize, our final algorithm works as follows:
1. First, group variables by the set of query expressions they appear in, and
then aggregate the variables within each group.
2. Until the plan covers all query nodes, do the following:
(a) For each pair of nodes in the incomplete plan, compute the expected
greedy coverage.
(b) If there exist some pairs of nodes that could be aggregated together
to form a missing query node, then aggregate one such pair with the
maximum expected greedy coverage.
(c) Otherwise, pick any pair with maximum expected greedy coverage
and aggregate them to form a new node.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in
P
q srq |Xq |
minq srq
, using an anal-
ysis similar to that for the deterministic queries case presented above, since the
initial expected greedy coverage is
∑
q srq|Xq|, and this decreases by at least
minq srq at each step. We observe that our algorithm performs within a con-
stant factor of any polynomial-time algorithm (unless P = NP ) in the inap-
proximable case described in the proof of Theorem 4.1.3. Initially, our algorithm
adds aggregates that compute all the ⊕-expressions of E ′ since these aggregate
nodes have zero extra cost. Once these nodes have been created, our algorithm
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then tries to find a greedy covering for the query node labeled eU , and there-
fore essentially runs greedy set cover, which is a (1 + log n)-approximation to
optimal.
4.1.3 Shared Sorting and Winner Determination
In the previous section, we provided techniques for sharing between auctions
with where the advertiser-specific factor of the click-through rate was identical
across all the bid phrases. In reality, it seems quite reasonable that the same
advertiser in the same slot position might have different click-through rates
for substantially different bid phrases. For example, a book store that mainly
sells books but also dabbles in selling movies and music might have a higher
advertiser-specific factor when the bid phrase is “books” than when the bid
phrase is “DVDs”. If this is the case, we cannot directly share the top-k aggre-
gation of the bici values across bid phrases as we did in Section 4.1.1, since the
value of ci can be different for each phrase. Instead, we devote this section to
examining how we can share work by exploiting the fact that the bi values are
shared across bid phrases.1
Threshold Algorithm
In order to share work between auctions, we use the well-known threshold al-
gorithm [34] to find the top q advertisers for each bid phrase that occurs in a
given round. In our context, the threshold algorithm works as follows. For a
1If, in addition, we allow the values of bi to vary across bid phrases, then there is no oppor-
tunity for sharing work between phrases at all, since no data is shared between the phrases.
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given bid phrase q, let cqi be the advertiser-specific factor of the click-through
rate of advertiser i for bid phrase q. Let jq1 , j
q
2 , . . . be an ordering of advertisers
who are interested in bid phrase q, ordered by descending values of cqi .
2 Let
iq1, i
q
2, . . . be an ordering of advertisers who are interested in bid phrase q, or-
dered by descending values of bi. The algorithm proceeds in stages. At each
stage s = 1, 2, . . . , the threshold algorithm incrementally maintains k indices in
{iqs′ : 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s} ∪ {jqs′ : 1 ≤ s′ ≤ s} with the highest values of bicqi . It terminates
early at the first stage s where all top k values are no less than the threshold
defined by biqscjqs . It is well-known that the threshold algorithm is instance op-
timal for the class of algorithms that find the advertisers with the top k values
of bic
q
i without making “wild guesses” (i.e., the algorithms must not access an
advertiser until that advertiser is encountered via a sequential scan of one of
the lists). Instance optimality means that, for any input, the threshold algorithm
finds the top k values within a constant factor of the time it takes the fastest
algorithm that avoids wild guess on that input. Thus, we could solve the top-k
problem for each bid phrase in an instance-optimal manner if we had a way
of listing, on demand, the advertisers interested in phrase q, starting with the
advertiser i with the highest bi and proceeding in decreasing order of bi values.
This motivates the following problem, which we call shared merge-sort.
Shared Sorting
Consider a sponsored search auction that matches some bid phrase q, and let
Iq be the set of advertisers who are interested in k. For ease of exposition, we
assume that each |Iq| is a power of two; the discussion generalizes to arbitrary
2We assume that the click-through rates are recalculated only occasionally and for the most
part remain fixed. Therefore the ordering jq1 , j
q
2 , . . . can be treated as fixed and can be precom-
puted.
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cardinalities in a straightforward way. The threshold algorithm as described
above initially asks for the advertiser i ∈ Iq with the highest value of bi. It then
asks for the advertiser from Iq with the next highest value of bi, and then the
next, and so on, until the threshold condition described above has been met. To
supply the threshold algorithm with an advertiser at each stage, we construct
a plan whose DAG is a balanced binary tree as used in a merge-sort of the set
{bi : i ∈ Iq}. Each leaf node is associated with a distinct bi from this set. Rather
than running the entire merge-sort upfront, we treat each non-leaf node as an
on-demand operator that stores a left register and a right register, and sends the
contents of the larger of the two registers upstream and then clears that register;
if a register to be read from is empty, its value is pulled from its correspond-
ing downstream node. This way, we don’t do any extra work beyond the stage
where the threshold condition is met. Each operator stores the sequence of val-
ues it has sent upstream. This will be used for caching results when operators
are shared between multiple sort plans.
Now suppose that there is some other auction for another phrase q′, and
let Iq′ be the set of advertisers who are interested in q′. If Iq ∩ Iq′ 6= ∅, then
we have already done some work in ordering advertisers who are interested in
k. We would like to re-use some of this work when feeding advertisers to the
threshold algorithm for phrase q′. Clearly, we can re-use the cached results of
any operators below which all leaves correspond to advertiser in Iq ∩ Iq′ . This
amounts to the problem of optimally sharing our on-demand merge operators
in the merge-sort trees for multiple bid phrases. With each each merge operator
v, we associate the set of advertisers Iv corresponding to the leaves below the
operator. Then, according to the usual merge-sort tree restrictions, two opera-
tors u and v can be merged into a new merge operator w only if Iu ∩ Iv = ∅ and
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|Iu| = |Iv|. The total number of times an operator v is invoked in the worst case
is |Iv|. This happens when the threshold condition is never met and the entire
set Iv is sorted. Since we do not model the distribution of values that the bis
take, we conservatively use this full-sort cost when evaluating the cost of shared
plans. Thus, the expected full-sort cost of a merge-sort operator in a shared
plan is |Iv|
(
1−∏q:v q(1− srq)), where srq is the probability that bid phrase q
appears in some auction, and q  v denotes the property that operator v is used
in bid phrase q’s merge-sort tree in the shared plan. By linearity of expectation,
the total expected full-sort cost of a shared merge-sort plan is
∑
v
|Iv|
(
1−
∏
q:v q
(1− srq)
)
.
Greedy Algorithm
We propose the following simple bottom-up greedy heuristic for building a
shared merge-sort plan that starts out with the leaf nodes, each correspond-
ing to a distinct advertiser, and successively merges the two nodes that would
lead to the largest savings in expected cost. When creating a new node w, we
annotate it with the set of bid phrases Qw whose merge-sort tree it contributes
to. Initially, each leaf nodes v is annotated with Qv = {q : v ∈ Iq}. At any point,
we can merge nodes u and v into a new node w only if Qu ∩Qv 6= ∅, Iu ∩ Iv = ∅,
and |Iu| = |Iv|. We then set Qw = Qu ∩ Qv and Iw = Iu ∪ Iv. We pick the u
and v such that the expected savings of merging them to create new node w is
maximized. The expected savings from creating node w is given by
|Iw| ∗
n∑
i=1
[( ∏
1≤j<i
(1− srqj)
)
srqi
(
n∑
j=i+1
srqj
)]
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whereQw = {q1, . . . , qn}. Note that
∑n
i=1
[(∏
1≤j<i(1− srqj)
)
srqi
(∑n
j=i+1 srqj
)]
is simply the expected number of queries in Qw that occur beyond the first.
4.1.4 Non-Separable Click-Through Rates
Our work in Chapters 2 and 3 went beyond the traditional assumption of sep-
arable click-through rates [58]. Advertisers were allowed to bid on clicks, im-
pressions, and purchases resulting from displaying their ad, and click-through
and purchase rates were allowed to be non-separable. The techniques we pro-
posed in Chapter 2 take advantage of the fact that the number of slots is usually
very small in comparison with the number of bidders. Recall that a complete bi-
partite graph is constructed with advertisers on one side and slots on the other.
The edge between an advertiser and a slot is weighted by the expected realized
bid that would obtained by assigning that advertiser to that slot. The graph is
then pruned to a much smaller graph by considering only the advertisers with
the k highest edges incident to each slot, where k is the number of slots. Then
the maximum weight bipartite matching is found between these O(k2) adver-
tiser and k slots using the well-known Hungarian algorithm [53]. Our work in
this chapter fits very well into that framework – we can use the shared top-k
algorithms presented in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 to find the top k advertisers for
each slot in the graph-pruning step required by our algorithm from Chapter 2.
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4.2 Shared Aggregation
In this section, we look at the problem of sharing aggregation between multiple
bidding programs. Recall that in Chapter 2, we proposed the idea of having
each advertiser run a bidding program on their behalf. In order to make in-
formed decisions about how to bid, it would be useful for these programs to be
able to compute quantities such as average (or maximum) bid placed on a given
set of bid phrases (e.g., those bid phrases containing the word ‘music’), or the
total number of users who have searched for one of a set of bid phrases. These
quantities can be computed using sum, average, and count aggregates over bid
phrases. Often multiple advertisers will want to perform similar aggregates
over similar sets of bid phrases, giving us the opportunity to share such aggre-
gation. We therefore consider aggregates other than the top-k aggregate that we
considered in Section 4.1. However, rather than considering the shared aggre-
gation problem for each particular aggregate, we take a more general approach
and employ the abstract algebraic framework that we introduced earlier. In this
section, we present the relationship between algebraic properties of the aggre-
gation operation in question and the complexity of finding the optimal shared
aggregation plan. To this end, we consider the following algebraic properties of
binary aggregation operator ⊕.
A1. ∀ a . ∀ b . ∀ c . a ⊕ (b ⊕ c) = (a ⊕ b) ⊕ c (associativity)
A2. ∃ e . ∀ a . a ⊕ e = e ⊕ a = a (identity)
A3. ∀ a . a ⊕ a = a (idempotence)
A4. ∀ a . ∀ b . a ⊕ b = b ⊕ a (commutativity)
A5. ∀ a . ∀ b . ∃! c . ∃! d . a ⊕ c = d ⊕ a = b (divisibility)
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These axioms can been used to characterize various algebraic struc-
tures of interest, including semigroups ({A1}), monoids ({A1, A2}), groups
({A1, A2, A5}), Abelian groups ({A1, A2, A4, A5}), bands ({A1, A3}), semilat-
tices ({A1, A3, A4}), quasigroups ({A5}), and loops ({A2, A5}). In this work, we
focus on those aggregates satisfying A4, since the most common and important
aggregation operators that come up in our setting, and in database and stream
settings in general are commutative. Such aggregates include sum, count, prod-
uct, max, min, top-k, and Bloom-filter unions and intersections. Moreover, these
aggregates can be combined with each other to compute other useful aggregates
such as mean and variance.
We have already seen axioms A1, A2, A3, and A4 from Section 4.1. For
aggregates satisfying the divisibility axiom A5, we can define a binary division
operator 	 that such that a 	 b returns the unique c such that a = b ⊕ c.
(Note that a 	 c = b since we are restricting our attention to commutative
operators and since divisors are unique by A5.) We assume that the cost of
evaluating the 	 operator is constant, and is the same as the cost of evaluating
the ⊕ operator. Then the 	 operator allows us to leverage divisibility to further
reduce the cost of plans in certain cases. For example, consider an aggregation
operator that is commutative, associative, and divisible (e.g., sum). Suppose we
have to evaluate the following five queries: u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x, u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕
y, u ⊕ v ⊕ x ⊕ y, u ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y, and v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y. (Since we are
assuming associativity, we can omit parentheses.) Without the 	 operator, the
best possible A-plan uses nine ⊕ operations. However, if we allow the use of
	, we can construct a plan that uses four ⊕ operations and four 	 operations,
for a total of eight operations, by constructing a sequence of nodes with the
following labels: u ⊕ v, u ⊕ v ⊕ w, a ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x, u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y,
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Table 4.4: Complexity Results for Optimally Sharing Aggregation
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 Complexity
N * * * N PTIME
N N N * Y PTIME
N Y N * Y PTIME
N N Y * Y PTIME
N Y Y * Y O(1)
Y * N Y N NP-complete
Y * N Y Y NP-complete
Y * Y Y N NP-complete
Y * Y * Y O(1)
(u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y) 	 x, (u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y) 	 w, (u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y) 	 v,
and (u ⊕ v ⊕ w ⊕ x ⊕ y) 	 u. Thus, if ⊕ satisfies A5, we extend the ⊕-
expressions over a set of variables X by starting with the variables in X and
closing off under both the ⊕ and 	 operators, and we extend the definition
of A-plans to allow the use of the 	 operator in addition to the ⊕ operator.
Although ⊕-expressions are extended to include the user of the 	 operator, we
restrict query expressions to contain only the ⊕ operator.
Let A be the set of the algebraic axioms above that the abstract ⊕ operator
under consideration satisfies. We provide a nearly complete characterization
of the complexity of shared aggregation for the various possibilities for A. Ta-
ble 4.4 summarizes our complexity results. Note that this includes a complete
characterization for commutative aggregates. The first line of Table 4.4 is han-
dled in Proposition 4.2.1. Lines 2 through 4 are handled in Theorem 4.2.2. Line
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5 and 9 are handled in Theorem 4.2.3. Theorems 4.2.4, and 4.2.5 provide the
complexity results for lines 7 and 8, respectively. In Section 4.1, we already saw
that the problem is NP-complete when {A1, A3, A4} ⊆ A and A5 6∈ A, giving us
line 6 of Table 4.4. We do not yet have complexity bounds for the cases corre-
sponding to lines 6 through 9, when A4 = N .
Proposition 4.2.1 If A1, A5 6∈ A and E is a finite set of⊕-expressions over a finite set
of variables X , then we can find a min-cost A-plan in time quadratic in the total size of
the expressions in E.
Proof If A1, A5 6∈ A, then there is a straightforward polynomial-time algorithm
for finding the optimal shared plan for all combinations of the remaining ax-
ioms. The algorithm turns the subtrees of the parse trees of the expressions in
E into a canonical form and then merges identical canonicalized subtrees in a
bottom-up fashion. This can be done in time quadratic in the total size of the
parse trees. 
Theorem 4.2.2 If A1 6∈ A, A5 ∈ A, {A2, A3} ∩ Ac 6= ∅, and E is a finite set of
⊕-expressions over a finite set of variables X , then we can find a min-cost A-plan in
time quadratic in the total size of the expressions in E.
Proof Let ε denote a “null” node with no label. If T and T ′ are trees, let T ⊕ T ′
denote the tree with a root labeled ⊕ connected to two subtrees, T and T ′. If
A4 6∈ A, then the edge to subtree T is colored red, and the edge to subtree T ′
is colored black; otherwise both edges are colored black. Let T 	 T ′ denote the
tree with a root labeled 	 connected to two subtrees, T and T ′, by a red edge
and a black edge, respectively. We write T = T ′ iff T and T ′ are isomorphic
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up to graph structure, edge coloring, and node labels. For any expression e
involving possibly both⊕ and	 operators, we define a tree T (e) inductively on
the structure of e as follows. If e is a variable x, then T (e) consists of a single
node labeled x. If e is of the form e1 ⊕ e2, then, T (e) = T (e1) if T (e2) = ε; else,
T (e) = T (e2) if T (e1) = ε; else, T (e) = T (e1) if T (e1) = T (e2) and A3 ∈ A; else,
T (e) = T if T (e1) = T 	 T (e2); else, T (e) = T if T (e2) = T 	 T (e1) and A4 ∈ A;
otherwise, T (e) = T (e1) ⊕ T (e2). If e is of the form e1 	 e2, then, T (e) = T (e1)
if T (e2) = ε; else, T (e) = ε if T (e1) = T (e2) and A2 ∈ A; else, T (e) = T (e2)
if T (e1) = T (e2) and A3 ∈ A; else, T (e) = T if T (e1) = T ⊕ T (e2); otherwise,
T (e) = T (e1) 	 T (e2). Then it is not hard to see that two expressions e and e′
are A-equivalent iff T (e) = T (e′). By the inductive nature of the tree definition,
every non-empty subtree of T (e) is isomorphic to T (eˆ) for some subexpression
eˆ of e. Furthermore, if e is an expression involving only the ⊕ operator, then
for every subexpression eˆ, T (eˆ) is a subtree of T (e). Putting these two facts
together, we see that if e and e′ are two A-equivalent expressions such that e
involves only the ⊕ operator, then every subexpression of e is A-equivalent to
some subexpression of e′.
Consider any optimal A-plan for E and any lowest (with respect to height
in the A-plan) node v with label e′ such that e′ contains the 	 operator and is
A-equivalent to some e ∈ E. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
e = e1 ⊕ e2, since the expressions in E involve only the ⊕ operator, and since
we can ignore trivial expressions that are just variables. Then the set of labels
of the nodes below v is the set of subexpressions of e′, by definition of an A-
plan. So every subexpression of e must be A-equivalent to the label of some
node below v, since e involves only the ⊕ operator. In particular, e1 and e2 are
A-equivalent to some nodes u and w below v. Note that e1 and e2 both involve
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only the ⊕ operator since they are subexpressions of e. Add e1 and e2 to E, and
observe that the plan is still A-optimal for E, since e1 and e2 are computed by
the nodes u and w anyway. Replace the two edges incoming to v by edges from
u and w, relabeling the nodes above (and including) v appropriately. Note that
this does not increase the height of any node since u and w were already below
v. Repeat this process until there are no more nodes with a label that contains
the 	 operator and is equivalent to some expression in E. This loop terminates
because, at every step, we either decrease the height of the lowest such node (if
the labels of either u or w contain the 	 operator) or else we eliminate at least
one	 operator from the labels of the query nodes (if the labels of neither u norw
contain the	 operator, in which case all	 operators in v’s label are eliminated).
Therefore, an optimal plan can be found by considering plans involving only the
⊕ operator, and so our previous algorithm works in this case as well. Therefore,
the algorithm outlined in the proof of Proposition 4.2.1 produces an optimal
A-plan here as well. 
Theorem 4.2.3 If {A1, A2} ∩ A 6= ∅ and {A3, A5} ⊆ A, then we can find a min-cost
plan in O(1) time.
Proof Suppose that {A1, A3, A5} ⊆ A. Consider any a and b. By A5, there is a
unique c such that c ⊕ a = b. Then we have the following.
c ⊕ (a ⊕ b) = (c ⊕ a) ⊕ b (by A1)
= (c ⊕ a) ⊕ (c ⊕ a) (by choice of c)
= c ⊕ a (by A3)
Thus, since right-divisors are unique by A5, a = a ⊕ b. By A3, a = a ⊕ a,
and so, by uniqueness of right-divisors, a = b. Thus, a = b for any a and b. So
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aggregation is trivial in this case, since ⊕ is a constant function and hence all
⊕-expressions are equivalent.
Now suppose that {A2, A3, A5} ⊆ A. By A2, there is some e such that a ⊕
e = a for all a. However, a ⊕ a = a for all a by A3. But, by A5, divisors are
unique, and so a = e for all a. So aggregation is trivial in this case, since ⊕ is a
constant function and hence all ⊕-expressions are equivalent. 
Theorem 4.2.4 Finding a min-cost A-plan for E is NP-hard when {A1, A4} ⊆ A,
{A3, A5} ⊆ Ac, and E is a finite set of ⊕-expressions over a finite set of variables X .
Proof We reduce this to the exact-cover problem, which is well-known to be NP-
complete [48]. Recall that, in the exact-cover problem, we are given a finite
‘universal’ set U and a finite collection S of subsets of U , and we must determine
whether there is some S ′ ⊆ S such that S ∩ S ′ = ∅ for all distinct S, S ′ ∈ S ′, and
such that ∪S∈S′ S = U .
Consider any instance of exact cover. Let U be the universal set. Let S be
the finite collection of subsets of U that cover U . We can convert this into an
instance of the problem of finding a minimum-cost A-plan using the following
construction.
Let the set of variables X = U ∪ {xS : S ∈ S} so that we have one variable
for each element of the universal set, and one distinct new variables xS for each
set S ∈ S. Let <X be an arbitrary ordering on the variables in X . For each
non-empty set S ⊆ X , we define a ‘canonical’ ⊕-expression eS as in the proof
of Theorem 4.1.2. Let E ′′ = {eS ⊕ xS : S ∈ S}. Let E ′ be the closure of E ′′ under
sub-expressions. Let E = E ′ ∪ {eX}. Note that this construction can be done in
polynomial time.
88
We now argue that S contains an exact cover of U iff the extra cost of all
minimum-cost A-plans for E is at most |S| − 2. Then we can tell whether or not
S contains an exact cover of U simply by examining the A-plan generated by
any algorithm that finds a min-cost A-plan.
For the “if” direction, suppose S contains an exact cover of U , say S ′ ⊆ S .
Then we can construct a plan with extra cost |S| − 2 as follows. Start with the
parse trees of the expressions in E ′′, merging those nodes with A-equivalent
labels if necessary to form a single plan. This plan clearly computes all the ex-
pressions inE ′′ and uses no extra nodes sinceE ′′ is closed under subexpressions.
The only expression left to complete is eX . This can be done by aggregating to-
gether the |S ′| nodes labeled eS , for each S ∈ S ′, and the |S| − |S ′| nodes labeled
e{xS} for each S ∈ S \ S ′. This uses |S| − 1 aggregation nodes, out of which
|S| − 2 are extra nodes (the node labeled eX does not count as an extra node
since eX ∈ E).
For the “only if” direction, suppose that there is someA-plan for E that uses
at most |S|−2 extra nodes. For a contradiction, suppose that S contains no exact
cover of U . Consider all the nodes with paths leading to the node labeled by eX .
These nodes induce an arborescence in the DAG rooted at the eX node. This
arborescence must contain all the extra nodes since all the other query nodes
are closed under subexpressions and can hence be aggregated using no extra
nodes. Consider the set V of nodes in the arborescence that are labeled by ⊕-
expressions inE ′ and have an edge into an extra node. Then there must be |V |−1
nodes descending from these |V | nodes in the arborescence. Out of these, |V |−2
will be extra nodes, and one will be the query node labeled eX . Now for each
S ∈ S, either the node labeled xS or else the node labeled eS ⊕ xS must be in
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V since these are the only two nodes labeled with an ⊕-expression in E ′ that
contain the variable xS by construction of E ′ and since xS was a distinct new
variable. Thus |V | ≥ |S|. Suppose for a moment that |V | = |S|. Then by the
pigeon-hole principle, all the nodes in V are labeled either with xS or eS ⊕ xS
for some S ∈ S. Let S ′ be the collection of sets S ∈ S for which some nodes
in V is labeled eS ⊕ xS . Now it is easy to see that, since {A1, A4} ⊆ A and
{A5, A3} ⊆ Ac, two ⊕-expressions over a set of variables X are A-equivalent iff
the multiset of variables appearing in the two expressions are equal. Therefore,
S ′ must form an exact cover of U , contradicting our initial assumption that S
contained no exact cover of U . There it is not possible that |V | = |S|. So it must
be the case that |V | > |S|, and hence there are more than |S| − 2 extra nodes
in the A-plan since there are |V | − 2 extra nodes. This completes the second
direction. 
Theorem 4.2.5 Finding a min-costA-plan forE is NP-hard when {A1, A4, A5} ⊆ A,
{A3} ⊆ Ac, and E is a finite set of ⊕-expressions over a finite set of variables X .
Proof We use the same reduction as the proof of Theorem 4.2.4 and observe that
the addition of the 	 operator does not change the proof; in particular, it is still
the case that |V | > |S| iff S contains no exact cover for U . 
4.3 Related Work
Early work on multiquery optimization includes work done by Sellis [71] to pro-
vide shared plans for select, project, and joint queries. However, this work did
not consider shared aggregation. Cocke looked at sharing work for computing
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expressions where the operators were commutative non-associative operators
in the context of compiler optimization by finding global common subexpres-
sions [22]. In contrast, our work focuses on operators that are associative as well
as commutative.
There has recently been a lot of work done in the context of data stream-
ing and sensor networks that is closely related to ours. For example, Dobra,
Garofalakis, et al. introduce a technique for computing approximate aggregates
by sharing work across multiple queries [29] transmitting ‘sketches’ of the data
rather than the entire data. In our setting, it is important to find the exact aggre-
gate values in order to ensure the desired economic properties of the auction,
such as truthfulness and envy-freeness. Trigoni, Yao, et al. look at optimizing
aggregates in sensor networks [79]. They focus on communication cost and use
more coarse cost-model than ours. They consider a unit cost of sending a vector
of aggregates whose length depend on the problem size. In contrast, we con-
sider the cost of computing each individual aggregate, which is a more accurate
computation cost model. Zhang, Koudas, et al. consider the problem of sharing
aggregation over data streams in the Gigascope system where the queries are
aggregates of group-bys of several attributes [86]. They use ‘phantom’ group-
by aggregates that contain partial results for multiple queries and propose a
greedy heuristic finding the optimal set of phantoms for count and sum aggre-
gates. Krishnamurthy, Wu, and Franklin suggest the use of fragments [52] (i.e.,
grouping inputs by the set of selection predicates that they satisfy) that we use
in the first stage of our algorithm. However, they did not take advantage of fur-
ther algebraic properties of the aggregation operator as we do. Huebsch, et al.
consider the problem of sharing aggregate computation for distributed queries
and classify aggregates based on whether or not they are linear and whether or
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not they are duplicate-insensitive [43]. Like [79], this work uses a coarser cost
model than ours. Other work on multiquery aggregation includes that of Silber-
stein and Yang where they look at aggregation using a set of multicast trees in a
network that satisfies certain assumptions on the relationship between the trees
[73]. Our setting is different in that, rather than being given a network, we have
to design an optimal network between sources (inputs) and sinks (queries).
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we highlight the opportunity for sharing work when there is a
high search volume by sharing the winner-determination computation across
multiple sponsored search auctions that occur simultaneously. We provided
techniques for both separable and non-separable click-through rates even if the
advertiser-specific factor is different across bid phrases in the case of separa-
ble click-through rates. As future work, we would like to determine whether
these algorithms have provable approximation bounds. We studied the prob-
lem of sharing aggregation operators between bidding programs as a function
of the algebraic axioms that they satisfy. We provide complexity results for most
combinations of the axioms, including a complete characterization for all com-
mutative cases. Future work includes determining the complexity of the few
remaining non-commutative cases.
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CHAPTER 5
REVEALING AUCTION DATA WHILE LIMITING DISCLOSURE
5.1 Introduction
In order to enable advertisers to improve their bidding strategies, it would be
helpful if search providers release historical search and auction data. However,
they must do so in such a way as to limit the disclosure about any individual
advertiser while still providing as much useful information as possible. For
example, suppose the search provider wants to release a table containing the
username, age, location, gender, and search topic that the user has been most in-
terested in (e.g., celebrity gossip, online gambling, etc.), as depicted in Table 5.1.
This table cannot be released as-is, since it would reveal the search habits of indi-
vidual users. Instead, the search provider could release an anonymized version
of this data by partially or completely suppressing identifying attributes (i.e.,
username, age, location, and gender) from the table, as depicted in Table 5.2.
Then, each time a user submits a search, the search provider could simply in-
form the advertisers of which bucket the user falls into.
Finding an appropriately anonymized version of the data is an instance of
the privacy-preserving data publishing problem, which is applicable to a wide
variety of settings beyond search auctions, including publishing census data for
policy makers, and hospital patient data for medical researchers. We consider
the following general situation. A data publisher (such as a search provider, or
hospital) has collected useful information about a group of individuals (such
as user profiles, or patient records) and would like to publish this data while
preserving the privacy of the individuals involved. The information is stored
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Table 5.1: Original Table
non-sensitive sensitive
Name Zip Age Sex Interest
Bob 14850 23 M Anarchism
Charlie 14850 24 M Anarchism
Dave 14850 25 M Online Dating
Ed 14850 27 M Online Dating
Frank 14853 29 M Hacking
Gloria 14850 21 F Anarchism
Hannah 14850 22 F Anarchism
Irma 14853 24 F Online Gambling
Jessica 14853 26 F Adult Sites
Karen 14853 28 F Celebrity Gossip
as a table (as in Table 5.1) where each record corresponds to a unique individ-
ual and contains a sensitive attribute (e.g., top interest, or disease) and some
non-sensitive attributes (e.g., address, gender, age) that might be learned using
externally available data (e.g., phone books, birth records). The data publisher
would like to limit the disclosure of the sensitive values of the individuals in or-
der to defend against an attacker who possibly already knows some facts about
the table. Our goal in this chapter is to quantify the precise effect of background
knowledge possessed by an attacker on the amount of disclosure and to pro-
vide algorithms to check and ensure that the amount of disclosure is less than a
specified threshold.
The problem we solve is of real and practical importance; an egregious ex-
ample of a privacy breach was the reidentification of a user from anonymized
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Table 5.2: 5-anonymous Table
Name Zip Age Sex Interest
* 1485* 2* M
Anarchism
Online Dating
Hacking
Anarchism
Online Dating
* 1485* 2* F
Anarchism
Online Gambling
Anarchism
Celebrity Gossip
Adult Sites
search logs published by AOL [11]. An even more famous incident was the dis-
covery of the medical records of the Governor of Massachusetts from an easily
accessible and supposedly anonymized dataset. All that was needed was to link
it to voter registration records [77]. To defend against such attacks, Samarati and
Sweeney [69] introduced a privacy criterion called k-anonymity which requires
that each individual be indistinguishable (with respect to the non-sensitive at-
tributes) from at least k − 1 others. This is done by grouping individuals into
buckets of size at least k, and then permuting the sensitive values in each bucket
and sufficiently masking their externally observable non-sensitive attributes.
Table 5.2 depicts a 5-anonymous version of Table 5.1. Table 5.3 depicts the per-
mutation of sensitive values that was used to construct this table.
However, k-anonymity does not adequately protect the privacy of an indi-
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Table 5.3: Bucketized Table
Name Zip Age Sex Interest
Bob 14850 23 M Anarchism
Charlie 14850 24 M Online Dating
Dave 14850 25 M Hacking
Ed 14850 27 M Anarchism
Frank 14853 29 M Online Dating
Gloria 14850 21 F Anarchism
Hannah 14850 22 F Online Gambling
Irma 14853 24 F Anarchism
Jessica 14853 26 F Celebrity Gossip
Karen 14853 28 F Adult Sites
vidual;1 for example, when all individuals in a bucket have the same sensitive
value, the sensitive values of the individuals in that bucket is disclosed regard-
less of the bucket size. Even when there are multiple sensitive values in the same
bucket, the frequencies of the sensitive values in the bucket still matter when an
attacker has some background knowledge about the particular individuals in
the table. Suppose the data publisher has published the 5-anonymous table as
depicted in Table 5.2. Consider an attacker Alice who would like to learn the
interests of her neighbors. One of her neighbors is Ed, a 27 year-old male living
in Ithaca (zip code 14850). Alice knows that Ed is a user of the search provider
that published the anonymized dataset in Table 5.3, and she wants to find out
Ed’s interest. Using her knowledge of Ed’s age, gender, and zip-code, Alice can
identify the bucket in the anonymized table that Ed belongs to (namely, the first
bucket). Alice does not know which interest listed within that bucket is Ed’s
1Indeed, the definition of k-anonymity does not even mention the sensitive attribute!
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since the sensitive values were permuted. Therefore, without additional knowl-
edge, Alice’s estimate of the probability that Ed is interested in anarchism is
2/5. But suppose that Alice knows that Ed doesn’t know much about comput-
ers and is therefore extremely unlikely to be interested in hacking. After ruling
this possibility out, the probability that Ed is interested in anarchism increases
to 1/2. Now, if Alice also somehow discovers that Ed is not interested in gam-
bling, then the fact that he is interested in anarchism becomes certain. Here, two
pieces of knowledge of the form “Ed does not have X” were enough to fully dis-
close Ed’s sensitive attribute. To guard against this, Machanavajjhala et al. [57]
proposed a privacy criterion called `-diversity that ensures that it takes at least
`−1 such pieces of information to sufficiently disclose the sensitive value of any
individual. The main idea is to require that, for each bucket, the ` most frequent
sensitive values are roughly equi-probable.
`-diversity focuses on one type of background knowledge: knowledge of the
form “individual X does not have sensitive value Y”. But an attacker might well
have other types of background knowledge. For example, suppose Alice lives
across the street from a married couple, Charlie and Hannah. Once again, using
her knowledge of their genders, ages and zip-codes, Alice can identify the buck-
ets Charlie and Hannah belong to. Without additional background knowledge,
Alice thinks that Charlie is interested in anarchism with probability 2/5. But
suppose that Alice knows that Charlie is very impressionable when it comes to
political outlook. Then Alice can deduce that if Hannah is highly interested in
anarchism, then it is extremely likely that Charlie is as well. This knowledge
allows her to update her probability that Charlie is interested in anarchism to
10/19. We show how these probabilities are computed in Section 5.3. `-diversity
does not guard against the type of background knowledge in this example.
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It is thus clear that we need a more general-purpose framework that can cap-
ture knowledge of any property of the underlying table that an attacker might
know. Moreover, unlike in the two examples above where we knew Alice’s
background knowledge, we will not assume that we know exactly what the at-
tacker knows. We therefore take the following approach. In Section 5.2, we
propose a language that is expressive enough to capture any property of the
sensitive values in a table. This language enables us to decompose background
knowledge into basic units of information. Then, given an anonymized ver-
sion of the table, we can quantify the worst-case disclosure risk posed by an
attacker with k such units of information; k can be thought of as a bound on the
power of an attacker. In Section 5.3, we show how to efficiently preserve pri-
vacy by ensuring that the worst-case (i.e., maximum) disclosure for any k pieces
of information is less than a specified threshold. Furthermore, we show to inte-
grate our techniques into existing frameworks to find a “minimally sanitized”
table for which the maximum disclosure is less than a specified threshold. In
Section 5.4, we show that our techniques can be applied to other types of back-
ground knowledge. In particular, we frame the existing notion of `-diversity
within our framework and show that it does indeed bound the maximum dis-
closure with respect to the type of background knowledge that it considers.
Such formal analysis and proof of correctness was missing in the original pa-
per [57]. We present experiments in Section 5.5, related work in Section 5.6, and
we conclude in Section 5.7.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such formal analysis of the effect
of unknown background knowledge on the disclosure of sensitive information.
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5.2 Framework
We begin by modeling the data publishing situation formally. Let P be a (finite)
set of individuals. For each p ∈ P , we associate a tuple tp which has one sensi-
tive attribute S (e.g., top interest, or disease) with finite domain and one or more
non-sensitive attributes. We overload notation and use S to represent both the
sensitive attribute and its domain. The data publisher has a table T , which is a
set of tuples corresponding to a subset of P . The publisher would like publish
T in a form that protects the sensitive information of any individual from an at-
tacker with background knowledge that can be expressed in a language L. (We
propose such a language to express background knowledge in Section 5.2.2.)
5.2.1 Bucketization
We first need to carefully describe how the published data is constructed from
the underlying table if we are to correctly interpret this published data. That
is, we need to specify a sanitization method. We briefly describe two popular
sanitization methods.
• The first, which we term bucketization [84], is to partition the tuples
in T into buckets, and then to separate the sensitive attribute from the
non-sensitive ones by randomly permuting the sensitive attribute values
within each bucket. The sanitized data then consists of the buckets with
permuted sensitive values.
• The second sanitization technique is full-domain generalization [77], where
we coarsen the non-sensitive attribute domains. The sanitized data con-
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sists of the coarsened table along with generalization used. Note that, un-
like bucketization, the exact values of the non-sensitive attributes are not
released; only the coarsened values are released.
Note that if the attacker knows the set of individuals in the table and their non-
sensitive values, then full-domain generalization and bucketization are equiv-
alent. In this work, we use bucketization as the method of constructing the
published data from the original table T , although all our results hold for full-
domain generalization as well. We plan to extend our algorithms to work for
other sanitization techniques, such as data swapping [24] (which, like bucke-
tization, also permutes the sensitive values, but in more complex ways) and
suppression [69], in the future.
We now specify our notion of bucketization more formally. Given a table
T , we partition the tuples into buckets (i.e., horizontally partition the table T
according to some scheme), and within each bucket, we apply an independent
random permutation to the column containing S-values. The resulting set of
buckets, denoted by B, is then published. For example, if the underlying table
T is as depicted in Table 5.1, then the publisher might publish bucketization B as
depicted in Table 5.3. Of course, for added privacy, the publisher can completely
mask the identifying attribute (Name) and may partially mask some of the other
non-sensitive attributes (Age, Sex, Zip).
For a bucket b ∈ B, we use the following notation.
• Pb denotes the set of individuals p ∈ P with tuples tp ∈ b,
• nb denotes the number of tuples in bucket b,
• nb(s) denotes the frequency of the sensitive value s ∈ S in bucket b, and
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• s0b , s1b , . . . denote the sensitive values appearing in bucket b in descending
order of frequency.
5.2.2 Background Knowledge
We pessimistically assume that the attacker has managed to obtain complete
information about which individuals have records in the table, what their non-
sensitive data is, and which buckets in the bucketization these records fall into.
That is, we assume that the attacker knows Pb, the set of individuals in bucket
b, for each b ∈ B, and knows tp[X] for every individual p in the table and every
non-sensitive attribute X . We call this full identification information. One way of
obtaining identification information in practice is to link quasi-identifying non-
sensitive attributes published in the bucketization (e.g., address, gender, age)
with publicly available data (e.g., phone directories, birth records) [77].
We make the standard random-worlds assumption [10]: in the absence of
any further knowledge, we consider all tables consistent with this bucketization
to be equally likely. That is, the probability of tp ∈ b having s for its sensitive
attribute is nb(s)/nb since each assignment of sensitive attributes to tuples within
a bucket is equally likely.
We now need to consider knowledge beyond the identification information
that an attacker might possess. We assume that this further knowledge is the
knowledge that the underlying table satisfies a given predicate on tables. That is,
the attacker knows that the underlying table is among the set of tables satisfying
the given predicate. This is a rather general assumption. For example, “the av-
erage age of people interested in online gambling in the table is 48 years” could
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be one such predicate. In order to quantify the power of such knowledge, we
use the notion of a basic unit of knowledge, and we propose a language which
consists of finite conjunctions of such basic units. Given full identification infor-
mation, we desire that any predicate on tables be expressible using a conjunc-
tion of the basic units that we propose. We employ a very simple propositional
syntax.
Definition 5.2.1 (Atoms) An atom is a formula of the form tp[S] = s, for some value
s ∈ S and individual p ∈ P with tuple tp ∈ T . We say that atom tp[S] = s involves
individual p and value s.
The interpretation of atoms is obvious: tJack[Interest] = online dating says that
the Jack’s tuple has the value online dating for the sensitive attribute Interest.
The basic units of knowledge in our language are basic implications, defined
below.
Definition 5.2.2 (Basic implications) A basic implication is a formula of the form
(∧i∈[m]Ai)→ (∨j∈[n]Bj)
for somem ≥ 1, n ≥ 0 and atomsAi, Bj , i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] (note that we use the standard
notation [n] to denote the set {0, . . . , n− 1}).
The fact that basic implications are a sufficiently expressive “basic unit” of
knowledge is made precise by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2.3 (Completeness) Given full identification information and any pred-
icate on tables, one can express the knowledge that the underlying table satisfies the
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identification information and the given predicate using a finite conjunction of basic
implications.
Proof Since the attacker is assumed to have full identification information, the
values of tp[X] and which bucket tp falls into are assumed to be common knowl-
edge. The only remaining information that it takes to completely define a partic-
ular table is the mapping between individuals and sensitive values within each
bucket. Thus we need to show that a finite conjunction of basic implications
can express any set of mappings between individuals in the table and sensitive
values. Note that, since the domain of S and the table size are finite, there are
only finitely many mappings between individuals in the table and sensitive val-
ues. Any particular such mapping between individuals and sensitive values
can clearly be represented by a finite conjunctions of atoms of the form tp = s.
Thus any set of mappings between individuals and sensitive values can be rep-
resented by a finite disjunction of finite conjunctions of atoms. We show that, in
fact, a finite conjunction of basic implications can represent any finite Boolean
combination of atoms.
Consider any finite Boolean combination of atoms. Without loss of general-
ity, assume that the formula is in conjunction normal form. It thus remains to
show that any disjunction of literals (i.e., atoms or their negations) can be rep-
resented by a finite conjunction of basic implications. We break this into two
cases depending on whether or not the given disjunction contains at least one
negative literal. In the first case, if the disjunction contains at least one negative
literal, then the disjunction is equivalent to a single a basic implication ϕ → θ
where ϕ is the conjunction of the atoms appearing in the negative literals and ψ
is the disjunction of the atoms appearing in the positive literals. In the second
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case, if the disjunction contains no negative literals, the disjunction is equivalent
to the following conjunction of basic implications: ∧s∈S(tp = s→ ϕ), where ϕ is
the given disjunction itself and p is any individual in the table. 
Hence we can model arbitrarily powerful attackers.2 Consider an attacker
who knows the sensitive value of every individual in the table except for Bob.
Then publishing any bucketization will reveal Bob’s sensitive value. To avoid
pathological and unrealistic cases like this, we need to assume a bound on the
power of an attacker. We model attackers with bounded power by limiting
the number of basic implications that the attacker knows. That is, the attacker
knows a single formula from language Lkbasic defined below.
Definition 5.2.4 Lkbasic is the language consisting of conjunctions of k basic implica-
tions. That is, Lkbasic consists of formulas of the form ∧i∈[k]ϕi where each ϕi is a basic
implication.
k can thus be viewed as a bound on the attacker’s power and can be increased
to provide more conservative privacy guarantees.
Note that our choice of basic implications for the “basic unit” of our language
has important consequences on our assumptions about the attacker’s power. In
particular, some properties of the underlying table might require a large num-
ber of basic implications to express. Since basic implications are essentially CNF
clauses with at least one negative atom, our language suffers from an exponen-
tial blowup in the number of basic units required to express arbitrary DNF for-
mulas. It may be that other choices of basic units may lead to equally expressive
2A major shortcoming of the `-diversity definition was that its choice of “basic unit” of
knowledge was essentially negated atoms (i.e., ¬tp[S] = s) which cannot capture all properties
of the underlying table. For example, negations cannot express basic implications in general.
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languages while at the same time requiring fewer basic units to express certain
natural properties, and we consider this an important direction for future re-
search. Nevertheless, many natural types of background knowledge have suc-
cinct representations using basic implications. For example, Alice’s knowledge
that “if Hannah is interested in anarchism, then so is Charlie” is simply the basic
implication
tHannah[Interest] = anarchism→ tCharlie[Interest] = anarchism.
And the knowledge that “Ed is not interested in hacking” is
tEd[Interest] = hacking→ tEd[Interest] = online gambling.
In general, we can represent ¬t[S] = s by (t[S] = s)→ (t[S] = s′) for any choice
of s′ 6= s since each tuple has exactly one sensitive attribute value.
Note that maintaining privacy when there is dependence between sensitive
values, especially across buckets, is a problem that has not been previously ad-
dressed in the privacy literature. The assignments of individuals to sensitive
values in different buckets are not necessarily independent. As we saw in the
example with Hannah and Charlie, fixing a particular assignment in one bucket
could affect what assignments are possible in another. One of the contributions
of this work is that we provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the
maximum disclosure even when the attacker has knowledge of such dependen-
cies.
5.2.3 Disclosure
Having specified how the bucketization B is constructed from the underlying
table T and how an attacker’s knowledge about sensitive information can be
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expressed in language Lkbasic, we are now in a position to define our notion of
disclosure precisely.
Definition 5.2.5 (Disclosure risk) The disclosure risk of bucketization B with re-
spect to background knowledge represented by some formula ϕ in language Lkbasic is
max
tp∈T,s∈S
Pr(tp[S] = s | B ∧ ϕ).
That is, disclosure risk is the likelihood of the most highly predicted sensitive attribute
assignment.
Definition 5.2.6 (Maximum disclosure) The maximum disclosure of bucketiza-
tion B with respect to language Lkbasic that expresses background knowledge is
max
tp∈T,s∈S,ϕ∈Lkbasic
Pr(tp[S] = s | B ∧ ϕ).
By our assumptions in 5.2.2, we compute Pr(tp[S] = s |B∧ϕ) by considering the
set of all tables consistent with bucketization B and with background knowl-
edge ϕ and then taking the fraction of those tables that satisfy tp[S] = s. Using
this, the maximum disclosure of the bucketization in Table 5.3 with respect to
L1basic turns out to be 1019 , and occurs when ϕ is tp′ = s′ → tp = s where p is an
individual in the first bucket, p′ is an individual in the second bucket, and s and
s′ are both anarchism. Our goal is to develop general techniques to:
1. efficiently calculate the maximum disclosure for any given bucketization,
and
2. efficiently find a “minimally sanitized” bucketization3 (or the set of all
minimally sanitized bucketizations) for which the maximum disclosure
is below a specified threshold (if any exist).
3We will make precise the notion of “minimally sanitized” in Section 5.3.4; we want “mini-
mal sanitization” in order to preserve the utility of the data.
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5.3 Checking And Enforcing Privacy
In Section 5.2.2, we defined basic implications as the “unit of knowledge” and
showed that this was a fully expressive (in the presence of full identification
information) and reasonable choice. We now show how to efficiently calculate
and limit maximum disclosure against an attacker who has full identification
information and has up to k additional pieces of background knowledge (i.e.,
up to k basic implications). In order to do this, we will show in Theorem 5.3.3
that there is a set of k basic implications that maximizes disclosure with respect
to Lkbasic. Furthermore, each such implication has only one atom in the antecedent
and one atom in the consequent. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 5.3.1 (Simple implications) A simple implication is a formula of the
form A→ B for some atoms A,B.
5.3.1 Hardness of Computing Disclosure Risk
Unfortunately, naive methods for computing the maximum disclosure will not
work – in fact, we can show that computing the disclosure risk of a given buck-
etization with respect to a given set of k simple implications is #P-hard. Note
that k simple implications can be written in 2-CNF, for which satisfiability is
easily checkable. Complexity is introduced in trying to simultaneously satisfy
the k implications and the given bucketization. In fact, deciding whether a given
bucketization is consistent with a set of k simple implications is NP-complete.
Theorem 5.3.2 Given as input bucketization B and a conjunction of simple impli-
cations ϕ, the problem of deciding if B and ϕ are both satisfiable by some table T is
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NP-complete. Moreover, given an atom C as further input, the problem of computing
Pr(C | B ∧ ∧i∈[k]ϕi) is #P-complete.
Proof Consider the problem of deciding if B and ϕ are both satisfiable by some
table T , given as input a bucketization and a conjunction of simple implications.
It is clear that the problem is in NP, because given a mapping of tuples to sen-
sitive values (which has a description that is linear in bucketization size), we
can verify that it is indeed consistent with the bucketization and that it satisfies
∧i∈[k](Ai → Bi) in polynomial time.
To show that the problem is NP-hard, we reduce the problem of deciding
3-CNF satisfiability, which is NP-complete, to this problem as follows. Consider
any 3-CNF formula. We construct a bucketization and set of basic implications
from this formula as follows. For each variable x mentioned in the 3-CNF for-
mula, we construct a bucket containing two tuples, named tx and t¬x, and two
sensitive values, T and F . For each clause C of the form X ∨ Y ∨ Z in the
3-CNF formula (where X, Y, Z are either variables or their negations), we con-
struct a bucket containing five tuples, named tCX , t
C
Y , t
C
Z , t
C
dummy1, t
C
dummy2, and five
sensitive values, T, T, T, F, F . The background knowledge then consists of the
following set of statements:
• tx[S] = T → tCX [S] = T , for every variable x and every clause C containing
literal X ≡ x,
• tCX [S] = T → tx[S] = T , for every variable x and every clause C containing
literal X ≡ x,
• t¬x[S] = T → tCX [S] = T , for every variable x and every clause C contain-
ing literal X ≡ ¬x,
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• tCX [S] = T → t¬x[S] = T , for every variable x and every clause C contain-
ing literal X ≡ ¬x, and
• tCdummy1[S] = T → tCdummy2[S] = T , for every clause C.
Let k be the number of implications that we added above. Note that k is linear in
the size of the 3-CNF formula. It is fairly clear that if there is a mapping of tuples
to values that is consistent with the bucketization and background knowledge,
then assigning each variable x to the value tx[S] satisfies the 3-CNF formula
(since, in each bucket corresponding to a clause, at least one tuple representing
a literal must have sensitive value T ). So we can decide if the 3-CNF formula
is satisfiable, given an oracle for our problem. Thus the decision problem is
NP-complete.
It should therefore not come as a surprise that computing the probability
of Pr(C | B ∧ (∧i∈[k](Ai → Bi))) is #P-complete since computing the probabil-
ity and counting satisfying assignments are intimately related. We reduce the
problem of counting the satisfying assignments of a 2-CNF formula, which is
#P-complete [80], to an instance of computing Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k](Ai → A′i))).
Consider a 2-CNF formula ϕ, with variables x0, . . . , xn−1. We can find a satisfy-
ing assignment of ϕ in polynomial time since ϕ is 2-CNF. Let ∧i∈[n]Xi represent
the satisfying assignment, where Xi is either xi or ¬xi, depending on the value
of xi in the satisfying assignment. Consider a complete binary tree with n leaf
nodes, where the ith leaf is associated with the literal Xi. For every non-leaf
node, we introduce a new variable y and a constant number of 3-CNF clauses
that are equivalent to y↔ (U ∧ V ), where U and V are the literals at the left and
right children of the non-leaf node. Let ϕ′ be the conjunction of all the newly-
introduced 3-CNF clauses. Then the conjunction of all the newly-introduced
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3-CNF clauses implies that z↔∧i∈[n]Xi where z is variable associated with the
root of the tree. Note that ϕ′ is polynomial in the size of ϕ since the complete
binary tree with n leaves has at most O(n) nodes, and we introduced a constant
number of clauses for each internal node. ϕ∧ϕ′ is 3-CNF formula. And ϕ∧ϕ′∧z
is a 3-CNF formula with exactly one satisfying assignment (namely, setting each
variable in ϕ according to ∧i∈[n]Xi, and each newly-introduced variable to true).
So, applying the construction from the proof of Theorem 5.3.2 to get A and Ai
from ϕ ∧ ϕ′, it is easy to check that 1
Pr(tz [S]=T |ϕB∧ϕ∧ϕ′) is exactly the number of
satisfying assignments of ϕ. 
5.3.2 A Special Form for Maximum Disclosure
It turns out that, despite the hardness results above, computing the maximum
disclosure with respect to language Lkbasic can be done in polynomial time. The
key insight is summarized in Theorem 5.3.3.
Theorem 5.3.3 For any bucketization, there is a set of k simple implications, all
sharing the same consequent, such that the conjunction of these k simple implications
maximizes disclosure with respect to Lkbasic.
This insight is tremendously useful in devising a polynomial-time dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm for computing the maximum disclosure with respect to
Lkbasic as it allows us to restrict our attention to sets of k simple implications of
the form (tpi [S] = si)→ (tp[S] = s) for individuals p, pi ∈ P , and values s, si ∈ S,
i ∈ [k]. The proof of Theorem 5.3.3 follows from the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 5.3.4 For any formulas ψ, ϕ, θi, ϕi,
Pr(ϕ | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕi))) ≤ Pr(ϕ | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕ)))
Proof For convenience of notation,
• let θ be ¬(∧i∈[k]¬θi),
• let χ be (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕi)),
• let u = Pr(θ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ),
• let v = Pr(¬θ ∧ ψ ∧ ϕ),
• let w = Pr(¬θ ∧ ψ),
• let x = Pr(θ ∧ χ ∧ ψ ∧ ϕ), and
• let y = Pr(θ ∧ χ ∧ ψ).
Then, for all ψ′ ∈ L, ∧i∈[k](θi → ϕ) ∧ ψ′ is logically equivalent to (θ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ′) ∨
(¬θ ∧ ψ′). Hence,
Pr(ϕ | (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕ)) ∧ ψ)
=
Pr((∧i∈[k](θi→ϕ))∧ψ∧ϕ)
Pr((∧i∈[k](θi→ϕ))∧ψ)
= Pr((θ∧ϕ∧ϕ∧ψ)∨(¬θ∧ψ∧ϕ))
Pr((θ∧ϕ∧ψ)∨(¬θ∧ψ))
= Pr(θ∧ϕ∧ψ)+Pr(¬θ∧ψ∧ϕ)
Pr(θ∧ϕ∧ψ)+Pr(¬θ∧ψ)
= u+v
u+w
.
Similarly, using that fact that, for all ψ′ ∈ L, ∧i∈[k](θi → ϕi) ∧ ψ′ is logically
equivalent to (θ ∧ χ ∧ ψ′) ∨ (¬θ ∧ ψ′), we get that
Pr(ϕ | (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕi)) ∧ ψ)
= Pr(θ∧χ∧ψ∧ϕ)+Pr(¬θ∧ψ∧ϕ)
Pr(θ∧χ∧ψ)+Pr(¬θ∧ψ)
= x+v
y+w
.
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However, since θ ∧ χ ∧ ψ ∧ ϕ logically implies both θ ∧ ϕ ∧ ψ and θ ∧ χ ∧ ψ,
we have u ≥ x and y ≥ x. Similarly, since ¬θ ∧ ψ ∧ ϕ logically implies ¬θ ∧ ψ,
we have v ≤ w. So, since u, v, w, x, y ≥ 0, we get u+v
u+w
≥ x+v
x+w
≥ x+v
y+w
, thus proving
the required result. 
Starting with any set of k basic implications that maximize disclosure,
Lemma 5.3.4 enables us to replace the consequent in all the basic implications
by a single common atom (namely the atom corresponding to the highest pre-
dicted assignment of sensitive value to an individual), while still maintaining
maximum disclosure. Note that there always exists some set of k basic impli-
cations that maximize disclosure since there are only finitely many atoms and
therefore Lkbasic is finite.
Lemma 5.3.5 For any formulas ψ,B, θi, where B is an atom and θi is a conjunction of
atoms, there exist atoms Ai such that
Pr(B | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](θi → B))) ≤ Pr(B | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](Ai → B))).
Proof Since each of the implications (θi → B) is basic, θi is a conjunction of
positive atoms. Hence, from each of the θi pick one of the atoms Ai (the atoms
need not be distinct). Clearly, θi → Ai. Hence, the required result follows from
Lemma 5.3.6. 
Lemma 5.3.6 For all θ0, . . . , θk−1, θ′0, . . . , θ′k−1, ψ, ϕ, such that θi → θ′i, for all i ∈ [k],
we have
Pr(ϕ | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕ))) ≤ Pr(ϕ | ψ ∧ (∧i∈[k](θ′i → ϕ))).
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Proof Note that
Pr(ϕ | (∧i∈[k](θi → ϕ)) ∧ ψ) = Pr((∧i∈[k](θi→ϕ))∧ψ∧ϕ)Pr((∧i∈[k](θi→ϕ))∧ψ)
= Pr(ϕ∧ψ)
1−Pr(∨i∈[k](θi∧¬ϕ)∨¬ψ) .
So it is enough to show that
Pr(∨i∈[k](θi ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ¬ψ) ≤ Pr(∨i∈[k](θ′i ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ¬ψ).
We know that θi → θ′i. Hence, any model that satisfies θi also satisfies θ′i.
This implies that any model that satisfies (∨i∈[k](θi ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ¬ψ) also satisfies
(∨i∈[k](θ′i ∧ ¬ϕ) ∨ ¬ψ). Hence, the required result. 
Next, Lemma 5.3.5 allows us to replace the antecedent of each of the result-
ing implications by an atom (possibly with a different atom for each implica-
tion), while still maintaining maximum disclosure.
In both Lemmas 5.3.4 and 5.3.5, we use ψ to represent the attacker’s knowl-
edge about the bucketization B. However, it is worthwhile pointing out that nei-
ther lemma places any restriction on ψ or on the underlying probability distri-
bution. This makes the results presented here extremely general and powerful
because they characterize the form of background knowledge that maximizes disclosure
risk for any form of anonymization and for any additional background knowledge.
The main idea behind the proof of Lemma 5.3.4 (and also Lemma 5.3.5)
can be illustrated as follows. Consider a bucketization B. Let (tpi [S] = si) →
(tp′i [S] = s
′
i), for i ∈ {0, 1}, be two simple implications which maximize the dis-
closure of B with respect to L2basic. For convenience, we let Ai denote the atom
tpi [S] = si and Bi the atom tp′i [S] = s
′
i. Let C be the atom tp[S] = s such that
Pr(C | B ∧ (∧i∈[2](Ai → Bi))) is the maximum disclosure.
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Table 5.4: Truth Tables
∧i∈[2](Ai → Bi) ∧i∈[2](Ai → C)
A0 A1 B0 B1 C A0 A1 B0 B1 C
a 0 0 * * 0 = 0 0 * * 0 a
b 0 0 * * 1 = 0 0 * * 1 b
c 0 1 * 1 0
d 0 1 * 1 1 ⊆ 0 1 * * 1 d′
e 1 0 1 * 0
f 1 0 1 * 1 ⊆ 1 0 * * 1 f ′
g 1 1 1 1 0
h 1 1 1 1 1 ⊆ 1 1 * * 1 h′
Now let us restrict our attention to the set of tables consistent with B. Let T1
be the set of tables satisfying the simple implications A0 → B0 and A1 → B1,
and let T2 be the set of tables satisfying A0 → C and A1 → C. Table 5.4 is
a diagrammatic representation of T1 and T2. Each row in the the truth table
on the left (resp., right) in Table 5.4 represents a subset of T1 (resp., T2). The
variables a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h in the left-most (resp., a, b, d′, f ′, h′ in the right-most)
column represents the size of the corresponding set. For example, the set of
tables represented by the second row is the set of tables that satisfy the atom C
but do not satisfy A0 and A1, and the number of such of tables is b.
It is now clear from Figure 5.4 that the implications A0 → C and A1 →
C also produce the maximum disclosure as follows. Pr(C | ∧i∈[2]Ai → Bi) =
b+d+f+h
a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h
and Pr(C | ∧i∈[2]Ai → C) = b+d′+f ′+h′a+b+d′+f ′+h′ . Also b+d+f+ha+b+c+d+e+f+h ≤
b+d+f+h
a+b+d+f+h
≤ b+d′+f ′+h′
a+b+d′+f ′+h′ since d ≤ d′, f ≤ f ′, and h ≤ h′. Thus Pr(C | ∧i∈[2]Ai →
Bi) ≤ Pr(C | ∧i∈[2]Ai → C).
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5.3.3 Computing Maximum Disclosure Efficiently
Having reduced our search space from sets of basic implications that could lead
to maximum disclosure to sets of simple implications with the same consequent,
we are now in a position to create an efficient algorithm to compute the max-
imum disclosure. We want to maximize Pr(A | B ∧ ∧i∈[k](Ai → A)) over all
atoms A,Ai, i ∈ [k]. Notice that for any atoms A,Ai, i ∈ [k] such that A and
∧i∈[k]Ai → A are consistent with bucketization B we have
Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k]Ai → A))
=
Pr(A ∧ (∧i∈[k](Ai → A)) | B)
Pr((∧i∈[k](Ai → A)) | B)
=
Pr(A | B)
Pr((¬A ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai)) ∨ A | B)
=
Pr(A | B)
Pr(¬A ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai) | B) + Pr(A | B) .
So it suffices to construct an efficient algorithm to minimize, over all atoms
A,Ai, i ∈ [k],
Pr(¬A∧(∧i∈[k]¬Ai)|B)
Pr(A|B) . (5.1)
In Section 5.3.3, we show how to minimize Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | B) over atoms Ai
involving individuals in the same bucket. We use this in Section 5.3.3 to pro-
vide a dynamic programming algorithm MINIMIZE1 that minimizes Formula
(5.1) over atoms A,Ai, i ∈ [k] involving individuals in the same bucket. Finally,
in Section 5.3.3, we use MINIMIZE1 to construct another dynamic programming
algorithm MINIMIZE2 to minimize Formula (5.1) jointly over the entire bucketi-
zation.
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Minimizing Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | B) for One Bucket
Consider all sets of k atoms involving individuals whose tuples are in a single
b ∈ B. Each set of k atoms is associated with a tuple (l, k0, . . . , kl−1), where l is the
number of individuals involved in the k atoms, and ki is the number of atoms in-
volving the i-th individual. We label the k atoms Ai,j for i ∈ [l] and j ∈ [ki] such
that atom Ai,j is the j-th atom (out of ki atoms) involving the i-th individual.
Lemma 5.3.7 provides a closed form for the minimum value of Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | B)
over all sets of k atoms associated with a particular (l, k0, . . . , kl−1).
Lemma 5.3.7 Let b ∈ B be any bucket. Let k, l, and k0, k1, . . . , kl−1 be such that
k = Σi∈[l]ki and ki ≥ ki+1 for all i ∈ [l − 1]. Let s0b , s1b , s2b , . . . be the sensitive values
arranged in descending order of frequency in b. Then Pr(∧i∈[l],j∈[ki]¬Ai,j | B) is mini-
mized over all atoms Ai,j when, Ai,j is tpi [S] = s
j
b, for all i ∈ [l] and all j ∈ [ki], where
p0, p1, . . . , pl−1 ∈ Pb are distinct. Consequently, the minimum probability is given by∏
i∈[l]
nb−i−
P
j∈[ki] nb(s
j
b)
nb−i . (5.2)
Proof When Ai,j is tpi = s
j
b for all i ∈ [l] and all j ∈ [ki], then it is easy to see that
Pr(∧i∈[l],j∈[ki]¬Ai,j | B) =
∏
i∈[l]
nb − i−
∑
j∈[ki] nb(s
j
b)
nb − i .
We now show, by induction on l (i.e., the number of individuals involved in the
k atoms), that for all b ∈ B and all atoms Ai,j (not necessarily ti[S] = si) such
that Ai,j and Ai,j′ mention the same tuple in b iff i = i′, we have
Pr(∧i∈[l],j∈[ki]¬Ai,j | B) ≥
∏
i∈[l]
nb − i−
∑
j∈[ki] nb(s
j
b)
nb − i .
In the base case (i.e., l = 1, k0 = k), all the atoms mention the same individual,
say p0. So takingA0,j to be tp0 [S] = s
j
b for j ∈ [k] clearly minimizes Pr(∧j∈[k]¬A0,j |
B), and actually achieves a probability of nb−Σj∈[k]nb(s
j
b)
nb
.
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Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for all l. Consider the case for
l + 1. Consider p0, the individual involved in the most (i.e., k0) atoms (namely,
A0,j , for j ∈ [k0]). Let S ′ be the set of values in S not involved in these atoms.
That is, S ′ = {s ∈ S : ∀j ∈ [k0] . A0,j 6≡ tp0 [S] = s}. For each s ∈ S ′,
• let ksi = ki+1, for each i ∈ [l],
• let Asi,j be Ai+1,j for each i ∈ [l] and each j ∈ [ksi ],
• let bs and Bs be the bucket and bucketization, respectively, obtained from
b and B by removing tp0 [X] and one occurrence of s from b.
Then it is easy to see that
• nbs = nb − 1, and
• ∑j∈[ksi ] nbs(sjbs) ≤∑j∈[ki+1] nb(sjb).
So, using these facts and the induction hypothesis, we have
Pr(∧i∈[l+1],j∈[ki]¬Ai,j | B)
=
∑
s∈S′ Pr(∧i∈[l+1],j∈[ki]¬Ai,j | B ∧ tp0 [S] = s) Pr(tp0 [S] = s | B)
=
∑
s∈S′ Pr(∧i∈[l],j∈[ksi ]¬Asi,j | Bs)nb(s)nb
≥ ∑s∈S′(∏i∈[l] nbs−i−Pj∈[ksi ]nbs (sjbs )nbs−i )nb(s)nb
≥ ∑s∈S′(∏i∈[l] nb−i−1−Pj∈[ki+1]nb(sjb)nb−i−1 )nb(s)nb
= (
∏
i∈[l]
nb−i−1−
P
j∈[ki+1]nb(s
j
b)
nb−i−1 )
∑
s∈S′
nb(s)
nb
≥ (∏i∈[l] nb−i−1−Pj∈[ki+1]nb(sjb)nb−i−1 )nb−Pj∈[k0]nb(sjb)nb
=
∏
i∈[l+1]
nb−i−
P
j∈[ki]nb(s
j
b)
nb−i .
This completes the induction. 
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Note that l ≤ k and k = ∑i∈[l] ki since each atom involves at exactly one
individual. So the question of minimizing Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | B) over all atoms Ai
that mention only tuples in b becomes one of minimizing
∏
i∈[l]
nb−i−
P
j∈[ki] nb(s
j
b)
nb−i
over all l ≤ k and all k0, . . . , kl−1 such that
∑
i∈[l] ki = k.
Algorithm 1: Minimize Within Bucket
1: procedure MINIMIZE1(b, i, kˆi, kˆ))
2: Input: b is the bucket under consideration
3: Input: i is the index of the next individual pi for which ki (i.e., the number of
atoms involving individual pi) is to be determined (initially 0)
4: Input: kˆi is the the upper bound for ki (initially k)
5: Input: kˆ is the number of atoms for which the individuals involved have yet to
be been determined (initially k)
6: pmin ← 1
7: for ki = 1, 2, . . . ,min(kˆi, kˆ) do
8: p← MINIMIZE1(b, i+ 1, ki, kˆ − ki)
9: p← nb−i−
P
j∈[ki] nb(s
j
b)
nb−i × p
10: pmin ← min(pmin, p)
11: end for
12: return pmin
13: end procedure
This can easily be done using Algorithm 1. Thus, calling MINIMIZE1(b, 0, k, k)
minimizes Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | ϕB) over all atoms Ai that involve individuals with tu-
ples in bucket b. It is easy to modify the algorithm to remember the minimizing
values of k0, . . . , kl−1, and thus we can even reconstruct the set of minimizing
atoms according to Lemma 5.3.7.
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Algorithm complexity. Note that the parameters of MINIMIZE1 are
bounded. That is, for every recursive call MINIMIZE1(b, i, ki, kˆ) that occurs in-
side the initial call to MINIMIZE1(b, 0, k, k), parameter b does not change, and
parameters i, kˆi, kˆ are all bounded by k (i.e., the number of implications we al-
low the attacker to know). So we can easily turn this into an O(k3) time and
space algorithm using dynamic programming.
Minimizing Formula (5.1) within One Bucket
Let us now minimize Pr(¬A∧(∧i∈[k]¬Ai)|B)
Pr(A|B) over all k + 1 atoms A and Ai, for i ∈ [k],
that only mention tuples in bucket b. Clearly any A,Ai that simultaneously
minimize the numerator and maximize the denominator will work. We know
that MINIMIZE1(b, 0, k + 1, k + 1) will minimize the numerator. According to
Lemma 5.3.7, at least one of these minimal k+1 atoms mention the most frequent
sensitive value. So, taking this atom to be A, we maximize the denominator as
well. Thus, the minimum value is given by
MINIMIZE1(b, 0, k + 1, k + 1)× nb
nb(s0b)
.
Minimizing Formula (5.1) over All Buckets
We look again at minimizing Pr(¬A∧(∧i∈[k]¬Ai)|B)
Pr(A|B) , except this time, we allow A and
Ai for i ∈ [k] to mention tuples in possibly different buckets. To do this, we make
use of the independence between buckets. Suppose that the k + 1 minimizing
atoms (includingA) are such that ki of them mention tuples in bucket bi, for each
i ∈ [l] for some l ≤ k+ 1. Let bj be the bucket containing the tuple mentioned by
A. Then, since the permutation of sensitive values for each bucket was picked
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independently, we can compute the minimum as
nbj
nbj(s
0
bj
)
×
∏
i∈[l]
MINIMIZE1(bi, 0, ki, ki).
So we need to minimize the above for all choices of l ≤ k + 1, j, and
k0, k1, . . . , kl−1 (which we can assume without loss of generality to be in descend-
ing order). Assuming buckets in B are labeled as b0, b1, b2, . . . , this is done by the
MINIMIZE2.
So MINIMIZE2(0, k, true) minimizes Pr(¬A∧(∧i∈[k]¬Ai)|B)
Pr(A|B) over all atoms A,Ai,
i ∈ [k]. It is easy to modify the algorithm to remember the i’s and hi’s, and
hence reconstruct the minimizing atoms.
Algorithm complexity. Note that the parameters of MINIMIZE2 are
bounded. That is, for every recursive call to MINIMIZE2(i, hi, a) that occurs
inside the initial call to MINIMIZE2(0, k, true), parameter i is bounded by the
number of buckets, parameter ki is bounded by the total number of implications
k, and a is either true or false. Thus, assuming that we first memoize (i.e., pre-
compute all possible calls to) MINIMIZE1 (which we can do in time O(|B|×k3)),
we can modify the MINIMIZE2 algorithm using dynamic programming to take
an additional O(|B| × k)time and space. So the whole algorithm can be made to
run in O(|B| × k3)time and space.
Incidentally, if two bucketizations B and B∗ differ only in that B∗ is the result
of removing some buckets from B and adding x new buckets to B, then, after
we run the algorithm for B, we memoize MINIMIZE1 for the x new buckets; so
the incremental cost of running the algorithm for B∗ is O(|B∗|×k+x×k3)-time.
Moreover, if we knew in advance which buckets will be removed, we can order
the buckets b0, b1, . . . to reuse the memoization of MINIMIZE2 as well.
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Algorithm 2: Minimize Across Buckets
1: procedure MINIMIZE2(i, hi, a)
2: Input: i is the current bucket bi (initially 0)
3: Input: hi is number of atoms Aj, j ∈ [k] that yet to be determined (initially k)
4: Input: a is a Boolean flag that indicates if atomA involves someone in an earlier
bucket bj , j < i (initially false)
5: rmin ←∞
6: if i = |B| then
7: return rmin
8: end if
9: for hi+1 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , hi do
10: u← MINIMIZE1(bi, 0, hi+1, hi+1)
11: x← MINIMIZE2(i+ 1, hi − hi+1, true)
12: if a = false then
13: // Atom A does not involve an earlier bucket bj , j < i
14: v ← MINIMIZE1(bi, 0, hi+1 + 1, hi+1 + 1)
15: rmin ← min(rmin, v × x× nbinbi (s0bi ))
16: rmin ← min(rmin, u×MINIMIZE2(i+ 1, hi − hi+1, false))
17: else
18: // Atom A involves an earlier bucket bj , j < i
19: rmin ← min(rmin, u× x)
20: end if
21: end for
22: return rmin
23: end procedure
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5.3.4 Finding a Safe Bucketization
Armed with a method to compute the maximum disclosure, we now show how
to efficiently find a “minimally sanitized” bucketization for which maximum
disclosure is below a given threshold. Intuitively, we would like a minimal
sanitization in order to preserve the utility of the published data. Let us be
more concrete about the notion of minimal sanitization. Given a table, consider
the set of bucketizations of this table. We impose a partial ordering on this set
of bucketizations where B  B′ if and only if every bucket in B′ is the union of
one of more buckets in B. Thus the bucketization B> that has all the tuples in
one bucket is the unique top element of this partial order, and the bucketization
B⊥ that has one tuple per bucket is the unique bottom element of this partial
order. Our notion of a “minimally sanitized” bucketization is one that is as low
as possible in the partial order (i.e., as close to B⊥) while still having maximum
disclosure lower than a specified threshold.
Definition 5.3.8 ((c, k)-safety) Given a threshold c ∈ [0, 1], we say that B is a (c, k)-
safe bucketization if the maximum disclosure of B with respect to Lkbasic is less than
c.
If the maximum disclosure is monotonic with respect to the partial ordering ,
then finding a -minimal (c, k)-safe bucketization can be done in time logarith-
mic in the height of the bucketization lattice (which is at most the number of
tuples in the table) by doing a binary search. The following theorem says that
we do indeed have monotonicity.
Theorem 5.3.9 (Monotonicity) Let B and B′ be bucketizations such that B  B′.
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Then the maximum disclosure of B is at least as high as the maximum disclosure of B′
with respect to Lkbasic.
Proof Let b1 and b2 be two buckets of sizes m and n respectively in bucketiza-
tion B. Let b be the bucket formed by merging b1 and b2 and let B′ be the new
bucketization.
To show monotonicity, it is enough to show that the minimum Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai |
B′) is at least as high as the minimum Pr(∧i∈[k]¬Ai | B), where Ai range over
atoms that involve only individuals in b in both cases.
According to Lemma 5.3.7, let tpi [S] = s
j
b be the atoms that minimize the
second probability (for B′), for i ∈ [l] and j ∈ [ki] (where p0, . . . , pl are the indi-
viduals involved in k0, . . . , kl atoms, respectively). Then, as in Lemma 5.3.7, the
minimum probability is given by
∏
i∈[l]
ai + bi − i
m+ n− i ,
where ai = nb1 −
∑
j∈[ki] nb1(s
j
b) and bi = nb2 −
∑
j∈[ki] nb2(s
j
b).
For each i, we define Pi , ci, and di inductively:
1. P0 = 1, c0 = 0, d0 = 0.
2. If ai−ci
m−ci ≤ bi−din−di then Pi+1 = Pi ai−cim−ci and ci+1 = ci + 1 and di+1 = di.
3. If ai−ci
m−ci >
bi−di
n−di then Pi+1 = Pi
bi−di
n−di and ci+1 = ci and di+1 = di + 1.
Think of this as choosing atoms tp′i = s
j
b for i ∈ [l], j ∈ [ki] where p′i is a new
individual in bucket b1 or b2 depending on whether ai−cim−ci ≤ bi−din−di or not. It is easy
to see that Pl ≥ P (∧i∈[l],j∈[ki]¬tp′i = sjb | B). Note that, by definition, ci + di = i
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for all i. So we have ai+bi−i
m+n−i =
ai−ci+bi−di
m−ci+n−di =
m−ci
m−ci+n−di
ai−ci
m−ci +
ni−di
m−ci+n−di
bi−di
n−di ≥
min(ai−ci
m−ci ,
bi−di
n−di ). So at each step i, we get Pi+1 by multiplying Pi by a factor that
is no more than ai+bi−i
m+n−i . So
∏
i∈[l]
ai+bi−i
m+n−i ≥ Pl ≥ P (∧i∈[l],j∈[ki]¬tp′i = sjb | B) and so
we are done. 
Another approach is to find all -minimal (c, k)-safe bucketizations, and re-
turn the one that maximizes a specified utility function. The monotonicity prop-
erty allows us to make use of existing algorithms for efficient itemset mining
[7], k-anonymity [13, 54] and `-diversity [57].4 For example, we can modify
the Incognito [54] algorithm, which finds all the-minimal k-anonymous buck-
etizations, by simply replacing the check for k-anonymity with the check for
(c, k)-safety from Section 5.3.3. We can thus find the bucketization that maxi-
mizes a given utility function subject to the constraint that the bucketization be
(c, k)-safe.
5.4 Maximum Disclosure and `-diversity
We now use our framework to analyze a different restriction on background
knowledge and relate this with a privacy condition recently proposed in [57],
called `-diversity. This exercise provides further insight into our techniques,
while at the same time contributing an essential piece of formal analysis that
was missing in [57], namely, proving that recursive (c, `)-diversity is equiva-
lent to ( c
c+1
, `− 2)-safety with respect to a simple language expressing sensitive
value elimination. This is an important contribution to our understanding of
4While these algorithms typically have worst-case exponential running time in the height of
the bucketization lattice, they have been shown to run fast in practice.
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(c, `)-diversity because it shows that (c, `) diversity protects against `− 2 pieces
of information involving possibly several different individuals, rather than the ear-
lier belief that it protects against ` − 2 pieces of information involving only one
individual.
Before we begin, however, let us quickly recall the definition of recursive
(c, `)-diversity.
Definition 5.4.1 (Recursive (c, `)-diversity) A bucketization B is said to be recur-
sive (c, `)-diverse if for all buckets b ∈ B,
nb(s
0
b) ≤ c× (nb − nb(s0b)−
`−2∑
i=1
nb(s
i
b)).
Intuitively, this definition states that a bucketization is (c, 2)-diverse if, for
every bucket, the most frequent attribute value of the sensitive attribute appears
at most c times as frequently as all the remaining attribute values of the sensitive
attribute combined. As argued in [57], it then follows that if an adversary is able
to eliminate k − 2 values of the sensitive attribute of one particular individual in
some bucket, the disclosure risk for that individual is at most c
c+1
.
We now show that eliminating the sensitive values for one particular indi-
vidual maximizes disclosure over background knowledge from language Lneg
(defined below), which allows for sensitive value elimination for possibly several
different individuals. Once again the disclosure maximizing background knowl-
edge has a special structure, namely, that all statements mentioned the same
tuple. Our proof uses the techniques from Section 5.3.
Definition 5.4.2 Let Lneg be the set of the formulas of the form ¬AwhereA is an atom.
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Recall that an atom is a formula of the form tp[S] = s. Lneg thus captures knowl-
edge of the form “Ed does not have the flu”.
Theorem 5.4.3 For any bucketization B, we have
max
atoms A,Ai
Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai)) = max
b∈B
nb(s
0
b)
nb −
∑
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
.
Proof This follows immediately from independence between the permutations
in separate buckets and Lemma 5.4.4 below. 
Lemma 5.4.4 Consider a bucket b ∈ B, and let p be any individual with a tuple tp in b.
Then Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai)) is maximized over all atoms A,A0, . . . , Ak−1 that involve
only individuals from b when
1. A is tp[S] = s0b , and
2. Ai is tp[S] = si+1b , for i ∈ [k].
Moreover, the maximum probability is given by
nb(s
0
b)
nb −
∑
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
.
Proof First note that when A is the statement tp[S] = s0b , and each Ai is the
statement tpi [S] = s
i+1
b , then it is easy to see that
Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai)) = nb(s
0
b)
nb −
∑
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
, (5.3)
since this is the relative frequency of s0b after s
1
b , . . . , s
k
b have been eliminated. We
now show that no other choice of atoms A,Ai (involving only individuals with
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tuples in b) gives a higher probability. We proceed by induction on the number
of individuals involved in the atoms A0, . . . , Ak−1 to show that
Pr(A | B ∧ (∧i∈[k]¬Ai)) ≤ nb(s
0
b)
nb −
∑
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
.
In the base case, where all the atoms A,A0, . . . , Ak−1 involve exactly one indi-
vidual, it is easy to see that the worst case is given by Equation 5.3. Now, us-
ing the induction hypothesis, assume that the lemma is true when the atoms
involve at most m − 1 distinct individuals. We will consider the case where
A,A0, . . . , Ak−1 involve m ≥ 2 individuals. Let p be the individual involved
in A. Now A0, . . . , Ak−1 involve some other individual p′ 6= p, since m ≥ 2.
Without loss of generality, A0, . . . , Ak′−1 be the atoms not involving p′ and let
Ak′ , . . . , Ak−1 be the atoms involving p′, for some k′ < k. For ease of notation,
we abbreviate ∧i∈[k]¬Ai by κ and ∧i∈[k′]¬Ai by κ′. Thus our original background
knowledge κ is split into two parts. The first part, κ′, is the part of our back-
ground knowledge not involving p′; the second part, ∧i∈[k]\[k′]¬Ai, is the part of
our background knowledge involving only p′. Since k′ < k, we can apply our
induction hypothesis to the statement κ′.
Let Sb be the set of sensitive values that appear in bucket b (i.e., Sb =
{s ∈ S : nb(s) > 0}). For each s ∈ Sb, let bs and Bs be the bucket and bucketi-
zation, respectively, that are obtained by removing the non-sensitive attributes
of p′ and an occurrence of s from bucket b. Then it is not hard to show that:
1. nbs = nb − 1,
2. nbs(s0bs) ≤ nb(s0b), and
3. 1 +
∑
i∈[k′] nbs(s
i+1
bs ) ≤
∑
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b ).
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So, using the induction hypothesis (in the first inequality below) and the above
facts (in the second inequality), we get:
Pr(A | B ∧ κ) = ∑s∈Sb Pr(A ∧ tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
=
∑
s∈Sb Pr(A | B ∧ κ ∧ tp′ [S] = s)
×Pr(tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
=
∑
s∈Sb Pr(A | Bs ∧ κ′) Pr(tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
≤ ∑s∈Sb nbs (s0bs )nbs−Pi∈[k′] nbs (si+1bs ) Pr(tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
≤ ∑s∈Sb nb(s0b)nb−Pi∈[k] nb(si+1b ) Pr(tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
=
nb(s
0
b)
nb−
P
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
∑
s∈Sb Pr(tp′ [S] = s | B ∧ κ)
≤ nb(s0b)
nb−
P
i∈[k] nb(s
i+1
b )
.
This completes the induction. 
5.5 Experiments
In this section, we present a case-study of our framework for worst-case disclo-
sure using the Adult Database from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [9].
We only consider the projection of the Adult Database onto five attributes: Age,
Marital Status, Race, Gender and Occupation. The dataset has 45,222 tuples af-
ter removing tuples with missing values. We treat Occupation as the sensitive
attribute; its domain consists of fourteen values. We use pre-defined general-
ization hierarchies for the attributes similar to the ones used by LeFevre et al.
[54]. Age can be coarsened to six levels (using intervals of size 1, 5, 10, 20, 40,
and 100 years), Marital Status can be coarsened to three levels, and Race and
Gender can each either be left as is or be completely suppressed. We consider
all the possible anonymized tables using those generalizations.
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Figure 5.1: Disclosure vs Number of Pieces of Background Knowledge
We computed the maximum disclosure for k pieces of background knowl-
edge, for k ranging from 0 (i.e., no background knowledge) to 12 (since we know
that maximum disclosure certainly reaches 1 at k = 13 because there are only
fourteen possible sensitive values). Figure 5.1 plots, for one anonymized ta-
ble, the number of pieces of knowledge available to an adversary against the
maximum disclosure for both negated atoms (`-diversity) and basic implica-
tions. In the anonymized table used, all the attributes other than Age were sup-
pressed and the Age attribute was generalized to intervals of size 20. The solid
line corresponds to implication statements and the dotted line corresponds to
negated atoms. This graph agrees with our earlier observation that implication-
type background knowledge subsumes negation; the maximum disclosure for
k negated atoms is always smaller than the maximum disclosure for k implica-
129
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2  2.2  2.4
M
i n
i m
u m
 W
o r
s t
- C
a s
e  
D i
s c
l o
s u
r e
Minimum Entropy
1 implication
3 implications
5 implications
7 implications
9 implications
11 implications
Figure 5.2: Entropy vs Maximum Disclosure Risk
tions. However, note that, for a given k, the difference between the maximum
disclosure for negated atoms and for basic implications is not too large. This
means that an anonymized table which tolerates maximum disclosure due to k
negated atoms need not be anonymized much further to defend against k im-
plications.
Intuitively, if all the buckets in a table have a nearly uniform distribution,
then the maximum disclosure should be lower, but the exact relationship is not
obvious. To get a better picture, we performed the following experiment. We
fixed a value k for the number of pieces of information. For every entropy value
h, we looked at the set T (h) of tables for which the minimum entropy of the
sensitive attribute over all buckets was equal to h. Among the tables in T (h),
we found the table T (h) with the least maximum disclosure for k implications.
130
Let the worst case disclosure for T (h) given k pieces of knowledge be denoted
by w(T (h), k). We plotted h versus w(T (h), k) for k = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 in Figure 5.2.
We see a behavior which matches our intuition. For a given k, the disclosure risk
monotonically decreases with increase in h. This is because increasing h means
that we are looking at tables with more and more entropy in their buckets (and,
consequently, less skew).
5.6 Related Work
Many metrics have been proposed to quantify privacy guarantees in publishing
publishing anonymized data-sets. ‘Perfect privacy’ [26, 61] guarantees that pub-
lished data does not disclose any information about the sensitive data. How-
ever, checking whether a conjunctive query discloses any information about the
answer to another conjunctive query is shown to be very hard (Πp2-complete
[61]). Subsequent work showed that checking for perfect privacy can be done ef-
ficiently for many subclasses of conjunctive queries [56]. Perfect privacy places
very strong restrictions on the types of queries that can be answered [61] (in par-
ticular, aggregate statistics cannot be published). Less restrictive privacy defi-
nitions based on asymptotic conditional probabilities [25] and certain answers
[75] have been proposed. Statistical databases allow answering aggregates over
sensitive values without disclosing the exact value [1]. De-identification, like
k-anonymity [68, 77] and “blending in a crowd” [18], ensures that an individual
cannot be associated with a unique tuple in an anonymized table. However,
under both of those definitions, sensitive information can be disclosed if groups
are homogeneous.
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Background knowledge can lead to disclosure of sensitive information. Su
et al. [76] and Yang et al. [85] limit disclosure when functional dependencies
in the data are known to the data publisher upfront. The notion of `-diversity
[57] guards against limited amounts of background knowledge unknown to the
data publisher. Farkas et al. [35] provide a survey of indirect data disclosure via
inference channels.
There are several approaches to anonymizing a dataset to ensure privacy.
These include generalizations [13, 54, 69], cell and tuple suppression [23, 69],
adding noise [1, 8, 18, 33], publishing marginals that satisfy a safety range [28],
and data swapping [24], where attributes are swapped between tuples so that
certain marginal totals are preserved. Queries can be posed online and the an-
swers audited [49] or perturbed [27]. Not all approaches guarantee privacy. For
example, spectral techniques can separate much of the noise from the data if the
noise is uncorrelated with the data [42, 47]. Anatomy [84] is a recently proposed
anonymization technique that corresponds exactly to the notion of bucketiza-
tion that we use in this chapter. When the attacker knows full identification
information, then generalization provides no more privacy than bucketization.
However, we recommend generalizing the attributes before publishing the data
since this will prevent attackers that do not already have full identification infor-
mation from re-identifying individuals via linking attacks [77]. In many cases,
the fact that a particular individual is in the table is considered sensitive infor-
mation [18].
The utility of data that has been altered to preserve privacy has often been
studied for specific future uses of the data. Work has been done on preserv-
ing association rules while adding noise [33]; reconstructing distributions of
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continuous variables after adding noise with a known distribution [6, 8]; recon-
structing data clusters after perturbing numeric attributes [18]; and maximizing
decision tree accuracy while anonymizing data [44, 83]. There have also been
some negative results for utility. Publishing a single k-anonymous table can
suffer from the curse of dimensionality [2] - large portions of the data need to
be suppressed to ensure privacy. Subsequent work [50] shows how to publish
several tables instead of a single one to combat this.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we initiate a formal study of the worst-case disclosure with back-
ground knowledge. Our analysis does not assume that we are aware of the ex-
act background knowledge possessed by the attacker. We assume bounds on
the the attacker’s background knowledge given in terms of the number of basic
units of knowledge that the attacker possesses. We propose basic implications
as an expressive choice for these units of knowledge. Although computing the
probability of a specific disclosure from a given set of k basic implications is
intractable, we show how to efficiently determine the worst-case over all sets
of k basic implications. In addition, we show how to search for a bucketization
that is robust (to a desired threshold c) against any k basic implications by com-
bining our check for (c, k)-safety with existing lattice-search algorithms. Finally,
we demonstrate that, in practice, `-diversity has similar maximum disclosure
to our notion of (c, k)-safety, which guards against a richer class of background
knowledge.
In the advertising auctions setting, our work has two important limitations.
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First, our framework assumes a single categorical sensitive attribute. Therefore,
we cannot handle multiple sensitive attributes or set-valued sensitive attributes
(e.g., search log data containing the set of phrases that each user has searched
for). Second, our framework assumes a one-time data publishing model. In
order to handle re-publishing updated data (e.g., when users’ interests change
from time to time), we would need to take into account the data that has already
been published when computing disclosure.
Another issue to consider is our choice of basic units of knowledge. Since we
chose basic implications as our units of knowledge, our algorithms will clearly
yield very conservative bucketizations if we try to protect against an attacker
who knows information that can only be expressed using a large number of
basic implications. One way to reduce the number of basic units required is
to add more powerful atoms to our existing language. For example, an inter-
esting class of formulas that require a large number of basic implications are
those of the form ∨s∈S(tp[S] = s ∧ tp′ [S] = s). Such formulas express equality
between the sensitive attributes of two tuples and can be expressed using |S|
basic implications. We could therefore try to update our framework to include
atoms of the form tp[S] = tp′ [S] in our language and consider basic implications
that contain these new types of atoms as well. Finding the right language for
basic units of knowledge is an important direction of future work. Other direc-
tions for future work include extending our framework for probabilistic back-
ground knowledge, studying cost-based disclosure (since it was observed in
[57] that not all disclosures are equally bad), and extending our results to other
forms of anonymization, such as data-swapping and collections of anonymized
marginals [50].
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we highlight the need for more expressive auctions, and
provide a means for advertisers to express dynamic strategies for bidding on
clicks, purchases, and slot positions in the form of bidding programs. Given
the output of these programs, we provide algorithms to solve the winner-
determination problem in time linear in the number of advertisers, reducing the
problem size to one that depends on only the number of slots. We extend our
techniques to accommodate more complicated scenarios, such as when adver-
tisers can win multiple slots, and when the probability of an advertiser receiving
a click depends on the slots assigned to other advertisers. We also identify im-
portant cases where we can reduce the work required to evaluate the bidding
programs using logical updates. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques
experimentally. We study the complexity of saving work by optimally sharing
aggregation between bidding programs during a single auction, and between
the winner-determination computation of multiple auctions. Finally, we pro-
vide a framework for revealing useful user information to advertisers while
limiting disclosure against any attacker who possesses a specified amount of
background knowledge.
There are many interesting opportunities for future work. Identifying other
features of bidding programs that could lead to finding the top k programs more
efficiently would be very useful. For example, if we are able to statically deter-
mine the frequency with which some programs update their bids, then we can
avoid running those programs whose bids we know will not be be changing
for a while. For the problem of optimally sharing aggregation between bidding
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programs, we provide complexity results for most of the abstract aggregators
that we considered; it would be nice to resolve the complexity of the few re-
maining non-commutative cases. Furthermore, in the cases that we show to be
NP-complete, it is of practical importance to determine whether approximate
solutions can be found efficiently. Another practical problem is how to find
good initial estimates for the click and purchase probabilities of new ads. When
a new ad enters the system, the probability that it will get a click is unknown,
and, in order to learn this probability, we need to display it even though it may
not lead to an optimal winner assignment. We need a way to occasionally inject
new ads into the winner assignment without affecting the long-term optimality
of winner determination too much.
Although we have assumed a fairly centralized system in this dissertation,
it is important to consider the issues that arise when running bidding programs
in a fault-tolerant distributed system. For example, it may be useful to have
several copies of a bidding program running on different servers in order to
protect against the failure of a single server. This raises questions about what
kind of consistency we need to guarantee across these replicas. At the very
least, the copies should see a consistent view of certain key variables, such as
the amount of daily budget that the advertiser has remaining. Moreover, in
a large distributed system, communication cost becomes an important factor
to consider. One interesting problem is that of assigning bidding programs to
servers spread across the world in such a way that the machines running the
bidding programs are located near the geographic area that the advertiser wants
to target, in order to minimize communication delay.
Our work on privacy-preserving data publishing can be extended in use-
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ful ways as well. For example, consider extending our techniques to handle
non-categorical sensitive attributes so as to deal with set-valued attributes (e.g.,
users’ keyword search history), and numerical attributes (e.g., users’ click fre-
quencies). This would allow search engines to publish data that is of great
utility not just to advertisers, but to researchers and website designers as well.
With these new kinds of attributes, we must consider new types of background
knowledge, such as statements involving the subset relation (for set-valued sen-
sitive attributes) and comparison relations (for numerical sensitive attributes).
Another issue that arises in practice is that user data changes over time, but our
framework assumes a one-time data publishing model. Allowing updated data
to be re-published in a privacy-preserving manner is a crucial open problem,
not just in our setting, but in the publishing of medical and census data as well.
Our work is a first step toward applying database principles to the excit-
ing and important problems arising in advertising auctions. We believe that
the database community has much to offer this area given its vast experience
with the trade-offs between expressiveness and scalability; providing advertis-
ers with more expressive bidding while retaining the scalability of these auc-
tions is crucial to the continued growth of this multi-billion dollar industry.
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